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The U.S. Constitution is old, relatively brief, and very difficult to
amend. In its original form, the Constitution was primarily a framework
for a new national government, and for 230 years the national
government has operated under that framework even as conditions
have changed in ways beyond the Founders’ conceivable imaginations.
The framework has survived in no small part because government
institutions have themselves played an important role in helping to fill
in and clarify the framework through their practices and interactions,
informed by the realities of governance. Courts, the political branches,
and academic commentators commonly give weight to such postFounding governmental practice in discerning the Constitution’s
separation of powers. That approach has been referred to as the
“historical gloss” method of constitutional interpretation, based on
language that Justice Frankfurter used to describe the concept in his
concurrence in the Youngstown steel seizure case. Some originalist
commentators, however, have advanced a potentially competing
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approach to crediting post-Founding practice, which they refer to as
“liquidation,” an idea that they ascribe to James Madison and certain
other members of the Founding generation.
To date, there has not been any systematic effort to compare gloss and
liquidation, even though the differences between them bear on the
constitutionality of a range of governmental practices relating to both
domestic and foreign affairs in the fields of constitutional law and
federal courts. This Article fills that gap in the literature. We first
provide an account of what must be shown in order to establish
historical gloss. Our account focuses on longstanding governmental
practices that have proven to be stable—that is, practices that have
operated for a significant amount of time without generating continued
interbranch contestation. We then consider the extent to which the
liquidation concept differs from that of gloss and whether those
differences render liquidation more or less normatively attractive than
gloss. We argue that a narrow account of liquidation, which would
focus primarily on early historical practice and disallow “reliquidation” of constitutional meaning once it had become settled by
practice, most clearly distinguishes liquidation from gloss, but that it
does so in ways that are normatively problematic. We further argue that
a broader account of liquidation, as recently offered by Professor
William Baude, responds to those normative concerns by diminishing
the distinction between liquidation and gloss, but that significant
differences remain that continue to raise normative problems for
liquidation. We also question whether either account of liquidation is
properly attributed to Madison.
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INTRODUCTION
In discerning the Constitution’s separation of powers, it is common for
courts, the political branches, and academic commentators to give weight
to post-Founding governmental practice.1 Reliance on such practice is
sometimes referred to as the “historical gloss” method of constitutional
interpretation, based on the way that Justice Frankfurter described the
concept in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.2
In that decision, the Supreme Court held that President Truman had
exceeded his constitutional authority in attempting to seize the nation’s
steel mills during the Korean War to avert a strike.3 Frankfurter wrote
separately to consider whether and to what extent historical practice might
support Truman’s authority to seize the mills.4
Frankfurter argued that historic governmental practice was relevant to
the question of the President’s seizure authority, asserting that “[i]t is an
inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to
confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which
life has written upon them.”5 In his view, although “[d]eeply embedded
traditional ways of conducting government” could not “supplant the
Constitution or legislation,” they could “give meaning to the words of a
text or supply them.”6 Frankfurter reviewed the historical practice
concerning executive seizure of property, however, and found it
insufficient to sustain Truman’s action. Finding only three instances of
presidential seizures comparable to the one at issue in the case, all of
which occurred in 1941, Frankfurter concluded that “these three isolated
instances do not add up, either in number, scope, duration or
contemporaneous legal justification, to the kind of executive construction
of the Constitution [that we have previously credited],” “[n]or do they
come to us sanctioned by long-continued acquiescence of Congress
giving decisive weight to a construction by the Executive of its powers.”7
The Supreme Court’s reliance on historical practice in discerning the
separation of powers long predates Frankfurter’s concurrence in
1
See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the
Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411 (2012).
2
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
3
Id. at 582–84.
4
Id. at 593–628 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
5
Id. at 610.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 613.
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Youngstown. For example, in a 1915 case, United States v. Midwest Oil
Co., the Court rejected a challenge to President Taft’s decision to
temporarily withdraw certain public lands from private development,
emphasizing the “long continued practice [of making] orders like the one
here involved.”8 Along similar lines, the Court in the 1920s, in concluding
that the President’s pardon power extends to a conviction for contempt of
court, reasoned that “long practice under the pardoning power and
acquiescence in it strongly sustains the construction it is based on.”9 And,
in another decision from that period, the Court emphasized longstanding
presidential practice when considering the circumstances under which the
President’s “pocket veto”—that is, failure to sign a bill before Congress
recesses—should be deemed to operate.10
A number of the Supreme Court’s modern separation of powers
decisions have also relied heavily on historical practice. In 1981, in
Dames & Moore v. Regan, the Court upheld executive orders transferring
billions of dollars in claims to an international tribunal in The Hague, as
part of the resolution of the Iranian hostage crisis, in large part based on
the historical practice of presidential settlement of claims.11 In doing so,
the Court expressly invoked Justice Frankfurter’s discussion of historical
gloss.12 Two more recent decisions have particularly emphasized the
importance of historical practice. In 2014, the Court in NLRB v. Noel
Canning relied heavily on historical practice in construing the scope of
the President’s authority to make recess appointments.13 The Court
explained that, because “the interpretive questions before us concern the
allocation of power between two elected branches of Government,” it was
appropriate to “put significant weight upon historical practice.”14 The
following year, in Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Court again emphasized
historical practice, this time in concluding that the President has an

8

236 U.S. 459, 469 (1915).
Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 118–19 (1925).
10
The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929) (“Long settled and established practice
is a consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions of this
character.”).
11
453 U.S. 654 (1981).
12
See id. at 686.
13
134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess:
Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 1 (analyzing the role of historical practice in Noel Canning).
14
Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2559 (emphasis omitted).
9
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exclusive authority to recognize foreign governments and their territories
that cannot be limited by Congress.15
Reliance on historical practice has also long been a staple of
constitutional reasoning within the executive branch. To take one of many
examples, executive branch lawyers rely extensively on practice in
discerning the scope of the President’s constitutional authority to use
military force. In 2018, for instance, the Justice Department’s Office of
Legal Counsel (“OLC”) concluded, based largely on historical practice,
that President Trump had the power to direct airstrikes against Syria in
response to its use of chemical weapons during the civil war there.16
Citing to earlier opinions from the Office, including one from 1970, OLC
explained: “We have recognized that ‘[s]ince judicial precedents are
virtually non-existent’ in defining the scope of the President’s war
powers, ‘the question is one which of necessity must be decided by
historical practice.’”17 Similarly, in 2011 OLC concluded, based largely
on historical practice, that President Obama had the constitutional
authority to direct U.S. military forces to take part in bombing operations
in Libya without first seeking congressional authorization.18 Quoting
from an earlier legal opinion concerning a military intervention in Haiti,
OLC asserted that “the pattern of executive conduct, made under claim of
right, extended over many decades and engaged in by Presidents of both
parties, evidences the existence of broad constitutional power.”19
Despite the prevalence of that sort of constitutional reasoning in the
judiciary and the executive branch, until recently few academic
commentators had given significant attention to it, or to its relationship to
other approaches to constitutional interpretation. That started to change
in 2012, when one of us co-authored an article exploring those
questions.20 The Noel Canning decision two years later further heightened
15

135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091 (2015) (“In separation-of-powers cases this Court has often ‘put
significant weight upon historical practice.’” (quoting Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2559)).
16
April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities, 42 Op. O.L.C. __
(May 31, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/file/1067551/download [https://perma.cc/QN7Q-HZKR].
17
Id. at 5 (quoting Presidential Authority to Permit Incursion into Communist Sanctuaries
in the Cambodia-Vietnam Border Area, 1 Op. O.L.C. Supp. 313, 317 (1970)).
18
See Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. __ (Apr. 1, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2011/04/31/authority-military-use-inlibya.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8RU-VLF7].
19
Id. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Deployment of United States Armed
Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. 173, 178 (1994)).
20
See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1.
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interest in the relevance of historical practice to the separation of powers.
Since then, a number of commentators, including the two of us, have
continued to try to unpack the concept of historical gloss.21
Some originalist commentators have invoked a different term to
describe the relevance of post-Founding practice to constitutional
interpretation: “liquidation.” Drawing on references to that term by James
Madison and certain other members of the Founding generation, those
commentators have outlined the conditions under which post-Founding
practice can potentially “liquidate” indeterminate constitutional meaning
such that it becomes “fixed.”22 The Supreme Court, too, has sometimes
invoked the idea of “fixing” constitutional meaning when referring to the
relevance of historical practice to constitutional interpretation.23 The word
“liquidation” is used in that context to mean essentially the opposite of
the principal modern connotation of the word; instead of signifying
dissolution (as in a “liquidation sale”), it is used to signify solidification
or determination (as in “liquidated damages”).24
In part because the concepts of gloss and liquidation have only recently
begun to receive sustained academic attention, it is not entirely clear
whether and to what extent they do or should differ from one another. In
Noel Canning, the Court seemed to assume that liquidation and gloss were
the same phenomenon. After quoting a reference to liquidation by
21
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional
Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 Geo. L.J. 255 (2017) (examining the
concept of historical gloss and its relationship to nonlegal but obligatory “constitutional
conventions”); Curtis A. Bradley, Doing Gloss, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 59 (2017) (examining the
relationship between how the historical gloss approach is implemented and the reasons for
crediting historical practice); Bradley & Siegel, supra note 13 (analyzing the role of historical
practice in Noel Canning).
22
In referring to “indeterminacy” in this Article, we are using it as a shorthand to encompass
a range of circumstances in which the meaning of the constitutional text is under-determinate,
including instances of “ambiguity, vagueness, gaps, and contradictions.” See Lawrence B.
Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 453, 469–72 (2013).
23
See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926) (“[A] contemporaneous
legislative exposition of the Constitution when the founders of our Government and framers
of our Constitution were actively participating in public affairs, acquiesced in for a long term
of years, fixes the construction to be given its provisions.”); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
299, 309 (1803) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to Congress’s requirement that Supreme
Court Justices sit on circuit courts, explaining that “practice and acquiescence under it for a
period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an
irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the construction”).
24
An obsolete meaning of “liquidate,” which is derived from the Late Latin “liquidare,” is
“to make clear or plain (something obscure or confused); to render unambiguous; to settle
(differences, disputes).” Liquidate, The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989).
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Madison, the Court wrote that “our cases have continually confirmed
Madison’s view.”25 In its string cite of decisions, however, the Court
included a number of decisions claimed by supporters of the gloss
approach, including Frankfurter’s concurrence in Youngstown.26 Legal
scholars also appear to be confused about the distinction, if any, between
gloss and liquidation. Writing a year after Noel Canning, Professor
Richard Fallon expressed uncertainty, describing gloss as “[c]losely
related” to liquidation but “possibly more capacious.”27
Although originalists often focus on history, usually it is history
relating to the constitutional Founding and the pre-Founding period.28
Perhaps because of that, for many years the only scholar to have
extensively addressed liquidation was Professor Caleb Nelson, who
described it in primarily historical terms.29 In a more recent article,
however, Professor William Baude has offered a more detailed and
contemporary account of the concept.30 Meanwhile, the historian
Jonathan Gienapp has published an important study of how, over the
course of the 1790s, Madison and others in the Founding generation
changed their understanding of the nature of the Constitution, including
its relationship to historical practice.31

25

134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014).
See id. (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 401 (1989); Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981); Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689–90 (1929); Ex parte Grossman, 267
U.S. 87, 118–19 (1925); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 472–74 (1915);
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 401 (1819); and Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803)).
27
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional
Adjudication, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1753, 1775 (2015); see also Tara Leigh Grove, The
Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 465, 541 & n.424 (2018)
(discussing “gloss” and stating that “[i]n a somewhat similar vein, Caleb Nelson and William
Baude have suggested that political practice can ‘liquidate’ (that is, settle) the meaning of
‘contestable’ constitutional provisions” (emphasis added)).
28
See Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 Fordham L. Rev.
641, 655–57 (2013) (describing how originalism has traditionally focused on history relating
to the adoption of the Constitution and its amendments).
29
Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519, 525–53
(2003) [hereinafter Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions]; Caleb Nelson, Stare
Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1, 10–21 (2001) [hereinafter
Nelson, Stare Decisis].
30
William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2019).
31
Jonathan Gienapp, The Second Creation: Fixing the American Constitution in the
Founding Era (2018).
26
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In this Article, we consider whether and to what extent the concept of
liquidation differs from that of gloss. We also consider whether, to the
extent that there are differences between liquidation and gloss, those
differences render liquidation more or less normatively attractive than
gloss. We argue that a narrow account of liquidation, which would look
primarily to early historical practice and disallow “re-liquidation” once
constitutional meaning had become settled through practice, most clearly
distinguishes liquidation from gloss, but that it does so in ways that are
normatively problematic. We then argue that Baude’s broader account of
liquidation responds to those normative concerns by diminishing the
distinction between liquidation and gloss, but that significant differences
remain that continue to raise normative problems for liquidation. Finally,
we question whether either account of liquidation is properly attributed to
Madison.
The differences between gloss and liquidation matter. In part because
of recent judicial appointments to both the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts, originalism may be experiencing a resurgence.32 At the
same time, originalist theory has become more receptive to
accommodating various non-originalist materials, including historical
practice.33 Unlike the changes in originalist theory over the years—from
a focus on the intentions of the Framers, to the understandings of the
ratifiers, to the original public meaning of the constitutional text—and
unlike the originalist embrace of judicial precedent and the idea of
“constitutional construction,”34 originalist efforts to claim a greater role
for post-Founding historical practice as within the originalist project have
not yet received much attention or recognition as such. Like those other
“impurifications” of originalism, however, the originalist turn to practice
presents originalists with difficult tradeoffs.35 As we will explain below,
those tradeoffs vary depending on whether one opts for gloss or
32
See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 019: Originalism, Legal Theory
Blog (last revised Aug. 11, 2019), https://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/01/legal_theory_le_1.html [https://perma.cc/UVY2-E25D] (“The current Supreme Court has at
least two members who seem strongly influenced by originalist constitutional theory—
Associate Justices Neil Gorsuch and Clarence Thomas. Three other[] Justices, John Roberts,
Samuel Alito, and Brett Kavanaugh[,] may also be receptive to originalist arguments—at least
in some cases.”).
33
See infra notes 45–53 and accompanying text.
34
See id.
35
For analysis of the phenomenon of theory “working itself impure,” with originalism as
one of several case studies, see Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves
Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1819 (2016).
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liquidation. More concretely, the constitutionality of many important and
longstanding governmental practices in the fields of both constitutional
law and federal courts may depend on that choice. Examples include the
recess appointments practices accepted in Noel Canning; the extensive
modern practice of using congressional-executive agreements in lieu of
Senate-approved treaties; presidential authority to order small-scale or
short-term uses of military force without congressional authorization; the
authority of presidents to withdraw the United States from treaties; the
longstanding practice of permitting non-Article III courts to adjudicate
federal law cases subject to certain limitations; and the even longer
practice of vesting less than the full Article III judicial power in the
federal courts notwithstanding the ostensibly mandatory language of
Article III.36
Part I explains why attention to post-Founding historical practice fits
more naturally with non-originalist theories of constitutional
interpretation than with originalist theories, and it considers why some
originalists are nevertheless paying increasing attention to practice. Part
II describes the historical gloss approach and explains why, under most
accounts, it does not require evidence of an interbranch agreement about
the meaning of the Constitution. It also argues that gloss is most
defensible in the separation of powers context. Part III assesses the extent
to which the liquidation approach is distinct from gloss. It argues that,
even under the relatively broad account of the concept recently offered by
Baude, there are differences, and that those differences render liquidation
normatively less attractive than gloss. Part IV explains why it is doubtful
that the liquidation approach as described by scholars such as Nelson and
Baude can properly be attributed to Madison. The Article concludes by
underscoring the importance of historical practice in light of the age,
brevity, and difficulty of amending the Constitution.
I. THE ORIGINALIST TURN TO PRACTICE
One of the central divisions in constitutional theory is between
originalist and non-originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation.
There are many versions of both originalism and non-originalism, but
they each have certain core elements. In particular, originalists tend to
insist that the meaning of the Constitution became fixed at the time that
its text was ratified and that interpreters are bound by that original
36

See infra notes 54–55, 115–124 and accompanying text.
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meaning. By contrast, non-originalists tend to accept that constitutional
meaning can change even absent formal amendments to the text and that
it can be appropriate for interpreters to apply the changed meaning.
Because non-originalist approaches accept that constitutional meaning
can change over time, it is not difficult for them to accommodate postFounding historical practice in constitutional interpretation. Many nonoriginalists are “pluralist” in that they are willing to credit a range of
materials, including history of various types.37 As Professor Eric Segall
has noted, pluralists “argue that judges use well-recognized factors such
as text, history, political practices, non-ratification era history, and
evaluations of consequences to decide cases.”38 And pluralists further
argue that it is appropriate for interpreters to use those multiple forms of
constitutional authority.
More specific non-originalist theories also tend to be compatible with
looking to historical practice. For example, reliance on historical practice
fits well with Burkean approaches to constitutional interpretation, which
emphasize longstanding traditions and understandings.39 It also fits well
with the somewhat related idea—most extensively developed and
defended by Professor David Strauss—of “common law
constitutionalism,” which involves an incremental interpretation of the
Constitution in light of both judicial precedent and tradition.40 Arguments
based on historical practice also overlap with non-originalist approaches

37
See, e.g., Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation 11–22 (1991) (discussing six
“modalities” of constitutional argumentation: historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, ethical,
and prudential); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 1189 (1987) (observing that, “[w]ith only a few
dissenters, most judges, lawyers, and commentators recognize the relevance of at least five
kinds of constitutional argument” (footnote omitted)); see also Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin
Toh, Pluralistic Nonoriginalism and the Combinability Problem, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1739, 1741
(2013) (attempting to set forth “a pluralistic nonoriginalist conception of constitutional law
that is clear and plausible enough to provide a focal point for debates about constitutional
interpretation”).
38
Eric Segall, Is Originalism a Theory?, Dorf on Law (Nov. 14, 2018), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2018/11/is-originalism-theory.html [https://perma.cc/MH6N-TDQG];
see also Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1753,
1753 (1994) (“Pluralistic theories of constitutional interpretation hold that there are multiple
legitimate methods of interpreting the Constitution.”).
39
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 353 (2006); Ernest
Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional
Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 619, 664 (1994).
40
See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution (2010); David A. Strauss, Common
Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877 (1996).
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that emphasize particularly decisive moments in history, such as
Professor Bruce Ackerman’s theory of “constitutional moments.”41
Non-originalists may be receptive to considering post-Founding
historical practice in part because doing so can help address one of the
principal objections to non-originalism. Nearly sixty years ago, Professor
Alexander Bickel coined the term “the counter-majoritarian difficulty” to
describe the democratic problem that exists when unelected judges use
the power of judicial review to tell popular majorities that they cannot
govern as they wish.42 If the judges are relying on materials external to
their own will, such as historical political branch practice, their decisions
may be less counter-majoritarian, especially if the materials themselves
have democratic elements.43 Moreover, the counter-majoritarian
difficulty is especially acute when courts seek to overturn longstanding
practices accepted and relied upon by both coordinate branches of the
government, which may justify particular judicial deference to such
practices in constitutional interpretation.44
In contrast to the general receptivity of non-originalism towards postFounding historical practice, such practice is not a natural fit for
originalism. Originalists tend to insist on what has been called the
“fixation thesis,” which provides that the communicative content of the
Constitution became fixed when the text of the Constitution was ratified.45
To be sure, variants of “new originalism,” which emphasize the idea of
“constitutional construction” as an enterprise distinct from constitutional
interpretation, appear to allow some role for post-Founding practice to
41
See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (1991). Alternatively, Professor
Ackerman can be thought of as an originalist of sorts—namely, an originalist who recognizes
a greater number of Founding periods than do most originalists (and nonoriginalists).
42
Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics 16 (2d ed. 1986).
43
Of course, it cannot simply be assumed that political branch practice is majoritarian,
especially given the many undemocratic institutions and practices within the political
branches. See Paul Brest et al., Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and
Materials 147–48 (6th ed. 2015); Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where
the Constitution Goes Wrong (And How We the People Can Correct It) (2006); Corinna
Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 Geo. L.J. 113, 144–57 (2012). But the
political branches are still generally regarded as more majoritarian than the judiciary.
44
See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 428–29, 434.
45
See Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original
Meaning, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 6–7 (2015); see also Keith E. Whittington, The New
Originalism, 2 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 599, 599 (2004) (“Originalism regards the discoverable
meaning of the Constitution at the time of its initial adoption as authoritative for purposes of
constitutional interpretation in the present.”).
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help determine the Constitution’s legal effect.46 But the concept of
construction is controversial among originalists,47 and the proper dividing
line between interpretation and construction is contested and uncertain.48
Moreover, depending on how it is applied, the construction concept has
the potential to undercut another common tenet of originalism—the
“[c]onstraint [p]rinciple,” whereby “the communicative content of the
Constitution should constrain constitutional practice, including decisions
by courts and the actions of officials such as the president and institutions
such as Congress.”49 Indeed, as Professor Jack Balkin’s work illustrates,
if the construction concept is applied broadly, it may largely collapse the
distinction between originalism and non-originalism.50 Anxiety about the
potential breadth of the construction zone has recently moved one
prominent originalist, Professor Randy Barnett, to propose resorting
exclusively to the original purposes or spirit of constitutional provisions
when operating within that zone,51 a type of consideration that is typically
anathema to formalists in matters of interpretation and so may not
46
See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and
Constitutional Meaning 6 (1999); Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 65, 65–66 (2011); Solum, supra note 22; Whittington, supra note 45, at 611–
12.
47
For a critique, see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods
Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 751, 752 (2009); see also Solum, supra note 45, at 5 (“Both the interpretationconstruction distinction and the construction zone are controversial.”).
48
See Laura A. Cisneros, The Constitutional Interpretation/Construction Distinction: A
Useful Fiction, 27 Const. Comment. 71, 75 (2010) (“No one has developed a formula for
predictably discerning between the two activities and it is doubtful that such a formula, if
devised and presented, would win more than minority support among constitutional
scholars.”); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the
Constitutional Text, 64 Duke L.J. 1213, 1269 (2015) (“It is not clear that all of these theorists
have precisely the same concepts in mind when they make this distinction [between
interpretation and construction].”).
49
Solum, supra note 45, at 8.
50
See Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism 3 (2011) (arguing for “framework originalism,
which views the Constitution as an initial framework for governance that sets politics in
motion, and that Americans must fill out over time through constitutional construction”). For
an argument that Balkin’s approach largely collapses the distinction between originalism and
non-originalism, see Neil S. Siegel, Jack Balkin’s Rich Historicism and Diet Originalism:
Health Benefits and Risks for the Constitutional System, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 931 (2013) (book
review); see also Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 Const.
Comment. 353, 355 (2007) (“[M]any originalists will read Balkin to be a living
constitutionalist in disguise—and may not let him into their club . . . .”).
51
See Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of
Originalism, 107 Geo. L.J. 1, 1 (2018).
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reassure other originalists.52 For those reasons, some originalists may be
inclined to reject any consideration of post-Founding historical practice
as in effect allowing for constitutional change without a formal textual
amendment.53
A complete rejection of historical practice, however, leaves originalism
vulnerable in a number of serious ways and thus helps explain why
originalists are paying increasing attention to it. First is the problem of
where to go when the original meaning is unknown or unknowable. For
some questions, there is little guidance in the constitutional text and no
judicial precedent on point, in which case historical practice may provide
the most objective material for making a decision. Issues relating to the
scope of executive power are a prime candidate for historical practice
because of the sparse nature of the text of Article II of the Constitution
and the substantially changed nature of the presidency over the course of
American history. To take one of many examples, although the text of the
Constitution instructs how the United States is to enter into treaties (by
the President with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate),54
it says nothing about how the United States is to terminate or withdraw
from them, something that has instead been worked out (largely in favor
of unilateral presidential authority) through practice.55
A second problem for an originalism that rejects historical practice is
the usual “dead hand” objection to being governed by the original
meaning of a text that is both old and very difficult to amend. Since the
Founding, there have been dramatic changes in both the nature and needs
52
See John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise
Constitutional Texts, 113 Yale L.J. 1663, 1665 (2004); John F. Manning, What Divides
Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 76 (2006).
53
Cf. Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-Originalism?, 62 Hastings
L.J. 707, 710 (2011) (“Given modern originalism’s origins as a response to the perceived
excesses of non-originalism, it is not surprising that many originalists have resisted
refinements to the theory that would tend to collapse the distinction between originalism and
non-originalism.”).
54
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
55
See Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 773
(2014). To address issues like that one, some originalists attempt to ground various executive
powers in the Article II Vesting Clause, U.S. Const., art. II, § 1, cl. 1, but there are serious
questions about whether that interpretation is consistent with the original understanding of the
clause. Only Justice Thomas on the current Supreme Court has embraced that interpretation.
See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2097–101 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Foreign Relations Law: Cases and Materials 167–69 (6th ed. 2017) (describing the academic
debate concerning that issue).
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of American governance, as well as dramatic changes in social values (not
just changes in facts, which strict versions of originalism can
accommodate). As a result, it is not clear how the Constitution can retain
its public legitimacy when interpreted only in accordance with a fullthroated originalism. To be sure, some prominent originalists—including
Professor Baude and our colleague Stephen Sachs—seem to treat it as a
sign of originalism’s intellectual integrity that, “for better or worse,” it
might not be possible to make the theory “safe for the modern world.”56
But for most people, it is not a selling point of an interpretive theory that
it can cause great disruptions to the fabric of the law and potentially cause
catastrophic social harm in the process. As a result, most originalists,
including those who wield judicial power, have in fact sought to make
originalism relatively safe for most Americans living today. Consulting
customary political branch practice may be one way to accomplish that
task, as Baude himself appears to recognize.57
A third objection to strict originalism is the charge that the theory is
less consistent than non-originalism with how American constitutional
law has actually operated and been understood throughout history—in
other words, that originalism is mostly normative, not genuinely our law
as a positive matter.58 That is a problem for originalists who want to
account for most of our constitutional practice, including the growth of
the modern state over the course of the twentieth century and judicial
decisions that are regarded as some of the greatest achievements of the
Supreme Court.59 It is also a problem for the realism of originalist
56
William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism’s Bite, 20 Green Bag 2d 103, 107
(2016); see also id. at 107–08 (“We come not to bring peace but a sword. Originalism is a
commitment to follow our original law, as lawfully altered; that commitment can and almost
surely will require rejecting some contemporary practice.”).
57
See, e.g., Baude, supra note 30, at 46 (“By looking to settlement across both institutions
and parties, and ideally with the public sanction, [liquidation] attempts to entrench traditions
that have been found acceptable by many groups of people.”).
58
Professors Baude and Sachs have provocatively argued that originalism is our law as a
positive matter. See, e.g., William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 2349
(2015); William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Grounding Originalism, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1455
(2019). For responses, see, for example, Charles L. Barzun, Constructing Originalism or: Why
Professors Baude and Sachs Should Learn to Stop Worrying and Love Ronald Dworkin, 105
Va. L. Rev. Online 128 (2019); Charles L. Barzun, The Positive U-Turn, 69 Stan. L. Rev.
1323 (2017) (arguing that Baude and Sachs’s “positive turn” is unsupported by any
articulation of legal positivism); Richard Primus, Is Theocracy Our Politics?, 116 Colum. L.
Rev. Sidebar 44 (2016); Eric J. Segall, Originalism Off the Ground: A Response to Professors
Baude and Sachs, 34 Const. Comment 313, 314 (2019).
59
For a powerful statement of that point, see Balkin, supra note 50, at 31–34.
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proposals to transform our constitutional practice. Although there is a first
time for everything, it seems unlikely that anything approaching strict
originalism will ever become “our law” as applied, even with recent,
originalism-friendly changes in the composition of the Supreme Court.60
We do not expect the Court in the years ahead to revisit, say, the
constitutionality of the administrative state as a general matter, the
modern scope of presidential power (again, as a general matter), or the
constitutionality of longstanding entitlement programs like Social
Security. Thus, to be realistic, originalism may need to take some account
of historical practice.61
Finally, many originalists are willing to accept judicial precedent
interpreting the Constitution, pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis,
even if the precedent is not consistent with the original understanding.
They do so either as a pragmatic exception to originalism,62 or as a move
that is ostensibly licensed by an original understanding of Article III.63
But important precedents are also established outside the courts. As
Professor Mitchell Berman has observed, “nonjudicial precedents have
significantly shaped American politics and culture,” including many that
have “never [been] subjected to legal challenge, hence never passed on
by a federal court.”64 Many of the standard values associated with

60
See supra note 32 and accompanying text (noting those changes in the Court’s
composition).
61
Because of the disruptions it would cause, a shift to strict originalism would also create
tensions with the rule of law and democratic legitimacy values that are often invoked in
support of originalism. Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Theory and Precedent: A Public
Meaning Approach, 33 Const. Comment 451, 461–63 (2018) (reviewing Randy J. Kozel,
Settled Versus Right: A Theory of Precedent (2017)) (suggesting that, for rule of law and
democratic legitimacy reasons, it might make sense for an originalist to accept non-originalist
precedent during a transition towards more originalist decisionmaking in order to avoid undue
disruption).
62
See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 140 (1997)
(describing stare decisis as “not part of [his] originalist philosophy” but “a pragmatic
exception to it”).
63
See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and
Precedent, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 803, 823–25 (2009). But see Gary Lawson, The Constitutional
Case Against Precedent, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 23, 24 (1994) (“[T]he practice of
following precedent is not merely nonobligatory or a bad idea; it is affirmatively inconsistent
with the federal Constitution.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting
Influence of Precedent, 22 Const. Comment. 289, 289 (2005) (“[S]tare decisis, understood as
a theory of adhering to prior judicial precedents that are contrary to the original public
meaning, is completely irreconcilable with originalism.”).
64
Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 34 (2009).
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deference to judicial precedent also apply to nonjudicial precedent.65 For
example, adherence to judicial precedent is said to promote stability,
consistency, and predictability in the law by protecting reliance
interests.66 Such interests, however, can presumably arise as a result of
governmental practices as well as judicial decisions. As a result, those
originalists who view stare decisis as a pragmatic exception to originalism
may have a hard time explaining why there should not also be a pragmatic
exception for non-judicial precedent. And originalists who view reliance
on judicial precedent as part of the Article III judicial power may face
difficulties explaining why reliance on historical practice is not also part
of that power, even though the Supreme Court began consulting such
practice very early in its history.67
In short, there are a number of reasons why originalists might want to
allow room for considering post-Founding historical practice in
constitutional interpretation (or construction). At the same time, there is
a serious risk that doing so will further collapse the distinction between
originalism and non-originalism beyond what has been wrought by the
attempts of many originalists to emphasize original meaning over original
intent and to incorporate stare decisis.68
In the balance of this Article, we analyze potentially competing
approaches to incorporating post-Founding historical practice in
constitutional interpretation. In Part II, we consider the historical gloss
approach, which tends to be favored by non-originalists. In Parts III and
IV, we describe the liquidation concept, in both its narrow and broader
forms, and we argue that in either form it is normatively less attractive
than gloss.

65

See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 427–28; Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial
Precedent, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 713, 736–64 (2008). For a general discussion of some of the
values served by stare decisis, see Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: A Theory of
Precedent 36–49 (2017); see also Baude, supra note 30, at 36–37 (“Liquidation has a close
relationship to the idea of judicial precedent, and it may therefore be able to find just as ready
a place in constitutional law.”).
66
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855–56 (1992).
67
See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803).
68
See supra notes 46–53 and accompanying text (noting those changes over time in
originalist theory); Kessler & Pozen, supra note 35, at 1844–47 (documenting the increasing
“impurification” of originalism).
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II. THE HISTORICAL GLOSS APPROACH
There is no canonical account of the historical gloss approach to
constitutional interpretation. It is most commonly invoked in connection
with issues relating to the separation of powers, and we explain below
why it is most defensible in that context. As the name “gloss” implies, it
is not typically treated as a free-standing source of constitutional law.
Instead, it is used to help interpret other constitutional materials, most
notably the constitutional text and structural inferences from the text,
when those materials are thought to be unclear with respect to the
constitutional question under consideration.69
The gloss approach is most famously associated with Justice
Frankfurter’s concurrence in Youngstown, but the idea was not original to
him, and he invoked an earlier decision in support of it.70 Moreover,
Frankfurter described the approach as it applies to executive power in
terms that, if strictly applied, would sharply limit its relevance:
[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by
Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as
it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our government,
may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President
by § 1 of Art. II.71

In reality, neither courts nor other interpreters have required that a
practice have “never before [been] questioned” before being credited as
gloss, presumably because very few practices would qualify as gloss if
subjected to such a demanding test. Relatedly, such a test would mean
that gloss would be of little help when it is most needed—that is, when
there is a dispute over constitutional interpretation.72

69

That is one reason why it can be hazardous to analogize gloss to types of custom that do
operate as freestanding law, such as customary international law. For commentators who make
that analogy, see, for example, Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving
Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. Rev. 109, 134 (1984), and Shalev Roisman,
Constitutional Acquiescence, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 668, 675 (2016).
70
See 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing United States
v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915)).
71
Id.
72
Unless context indicates otherwise, we use the term “interpretation” here and elsewhere
in this Article in the informal way that it is used by judges and other non-specialists rather
than in the more specialized way that it is used by some originalist commentators. In other
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In this Part, we sketch the general contours of what we understand to
be the gloss approach. In doing so, we give particular weight to the
Court’s decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning,73 because it is not only recent
but also represents the Court’s most sustained and self-conscious
consideration of the relevance of historical practice to the separation of
powers. As we explain, gloss is focused on longstanding governmental
practices that have proven to be stable—that is, practices that have
operated for a significant amount of time without generating continued
inter-branch contestation. After describing the core elements of gloss, we
address two issues relating to gloss that—as will become apparent in Part
III—are especially relevant when comparing gloss with liquidation: first,
whether gloss requires evidence of a constitutional agreement between
the acting branch and the affected branch; and second, whether gloss
applies outside the domain of separation of powers.
A. General Requirements for Gloss
As illustrated by Noel Canning, there are at least three requirements for
gloss: (1) governmental practice; (2) longstanding duration; and (3)
acquiescence, which we interpret below as requiring at least reasonable
stability in the practice but not necessarily inter-branch constitutional
agreement.
First, gloss is focused on governmental practice—that is, the actions
and inactions of government institutions, whether executive, legislative,
or judicial. Gloss is not focused on historical traditions or events in
general, or on public or social attitudes.74 In addition, more weight is
generally placed on the actual behavior of institutions than on their stated
views, for the obvious reason that talk can be cheap in politics.
Nonetheless, governmental statements and reasoning are still relevant,
because, among other things, they can provide insights into how
participants in a practice understand the practice and its scope, and also
because it can be evidence of reliance on a practice. In Noel Canning, for
example, the Court reviewed in detail both the history of presidential
words, when referring to interpretation, we generally do not attempt to distinguish it from
“construction.”
73
134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
74
Not all commentators seeking to critique gloss have appreciated that point. See, e.g.,
Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, 126 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 75, 77 (2013)
(wondering whether the relevant historical practice for purposes of gloss is “custom, tradition,
prescription, or something else”).
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recess appointments and how the Senate responded to them, and it looked
to executive branch memoranda in large part as confirmation that
“upset[ting] this traditional practice . . . would seriously shrink the
authority that Presidents have believed existed and have exercised for so
long.”75
Second, in order for the relevant practice to be credited, it must be of
longstanding duration. There is no magic number of years, but the case
for gloss is strongest when the practice has continued over numerous
presidential administrations and has enjoyed the support of both major
political parties (because such practices are less likely to be the product
of mere partisan politics).76 The practice need not, however, date to or
near the Founding period, and modern practice can potentially qualify as
gloss even if it differs from earlier practice. In Noel Canning, the Court
emphasized that, although “pre-Civil War history is not helpful” in
resolving whether the President had the authority to make “intra-session”
recess appointments,77 modern practice was sufficient to establish gloss:
Since 1929, and particularly since the end of World War II, Congress
has shortened its inter-session breaks as it has taken longer and more
frequent intra-session breaks; Presidents have correspondingly made
more intra-session recess appointments. Indeed, if we include military
appointments, Presidents have made thousands of intra-session recess
appointments.78

The Court explained that “three-quarters of a century of settled practice
is long enough to entitle a practice to ‘great weight in a proper
interpretation’ of the constitutional provision.”79
Third, there must be acquiescence by the affected branch (for example,
Congress in the case of an exercise of executive power), which means at
least that the practice must have become reasonably stable over time. As

75

134 S. Ct. at 2573.
There is also no magic number in terms of the frequency or density of the practice,
characteristics that will vary depending on how often the issue tends to arise and the nature
and context of particular events. If the practice has been very infrequent, however, there may
be questions about whether there is in fact a course of practice.
77
134 S. Ct. at 2561.
78
Id. at 2562.
79
Id. at 2564 (quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929)). By contrast, as
noted in the Introduction, Justice Frankfurter concluded in Youngstown that three recent and
isolated instances of presidential property seizure were insufficient to establish a gloss on
executive power. See supra text accompanying note 7.
76
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we explain further below in Section II.B, stability does not necessarily
require that the relevant institutions have reached an agreement about the
meaning of the Constitution, although if there is such an agreement then
the case for gloss is stronger because the likelihood of stability is higher.
Instead, the practice must have operated for a significant amount of time
without generating continued inter-branch contestation. Such stability
might be confirmed by the inaction of an affected branch, even if such
inaction does not necessarily show that there is a shared constitutional
interpretation.80 In Noel Canning, for example, the Court emphasized that
although the Senate had been hostile at times to recess appointments made
to fill vacancies that predated the recess, “the Senate subsequently
abandoned its hostility” and, in addressing issues relating to recess
appointments in the twentieth century, the Senate had not argued that the
presidential practice was unconstitutional.81 The fact that “[t]he Senate as
a body has not countered this practice for nearly three-quarters of a
century, perhaps longer”82 gave the practice enough stability to qualify as
gloss.
Because stability is required for gloss, one normative issue is the
danger that it might unduly favor executive power over congressional
authority because it is easier for the executive to engage in unilateral
action, and it can be difficult for Congress as an institution to overcome
collective action problems and contest such practice.83 That is an
important concern, but it can potentially be addressed by embracing a
broad conception of what counts as contestation—for example, extending
it beyond the enactment of opposing statutes and including various forms
of congressional “soft law,” such as committee reports and nonbinding
resolutions.84 The Court in Noel Canning may have given a nudge to the
consideration of such soft law in noting that “neither the Senate
considered as a body nor its committees, despite opportunities to express
80
See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2094 (2015) (treating as relevant the lack
of congressional regulation of recognition issues throughout much of the twentieth century
without attempting to establish that this inaction was the result of a perception by Congress
that it lacked constitutional authority to regulate).
81
134 S. Ct. at 2572.
82
Id. at 2573.
83
See generally Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral
Action, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 132 (1999) (describing the President’s power to act unilaterally,
in part due to collective action problems faced by Congress).
84
For discussions of congressional soft law, see Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160
U. Pa. L. Rev. 715, 742–61 (2012), and Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons
from Congressional Practice, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 573 (2008).
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opposition to the practice of intra-session recess appointments, has done
so.”85 (Isolated objections from individual members of Congress,
however, presumably would not qualify as continued inter-branch
contestation of a practice.)
To be clear, we are relying on Noel Canning here not because one
should assume that the Supreme Court is necessarily right about how to
implement a particular approach to constitutional interpretation. Instead,
we are relying on it to help illustrate the approach to gloss that we are
independently defending and will use as a reference point when
comparing gloss with liquidation. Ultimately, the proper contours of an
approach to gloss should depend on one’s normative justifications for
relying on historical practice in constitutional interpretation, a point that
we take into account in the next two Sections as we further refine our
account of gloss.
We should also emphasize that our goal here is simply to outline the
core elements of the gloss approach so that it can be compared with
liquidation. As a result, we do not purport to address all of the
methodological issues that gloss may implicate. For example, although
we have mentioned the implications for stability of one branch’s inaction
in the face of longstanding practice by another branch, we have not
addressed the implications of inaction for the constitutional authority of
the inactive branch, which often (although not inevitably) is Congress. If
a long period has passed in which one of the three federal branches has
not engaged in a practice, to what extent does such inaction suggest that
it lacks the constitutional authority to do so? The Supreme Court has in
recent times emphasized that sort of past inaction—that is, it has
emphasized the novelty of an action now taken by a federal branch—
when concluding that the action is unconstitutional on either separation
of powers or federalism grounds.86 Without attempting to resolve that
85

134 S. Ct. at 2563 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091 (2015) (“‘[T]he most striking thing’
about the history of recognition ‘is what is absent from it: a situation like this one,’ where
Congress has enacted a statute contrary to the President’s formal and considered statement
concerning recognition.” (quoting Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 725 F.3d 197, 221 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (Tatel, J., concurring))); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561
U.S. 477, 505 (2010) (“Perhaps the most telling indication of the severe constitutional problem
with the [Public Company Accounting Oversight Board] is the lack of historical precedent for
this entity.” (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667,
699 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)));
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008) (emphasizing that the presidential action to
compel Texas to comply with an international court’s decision was “unprecedented” (quoting
86
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issue here, we note that there can be a variety of reasons why action has
not been taken before, including that there was not previously a perceived
need for such action.87 For that and other reasons, if inaction is to be
treated as evidence of a branch’s lack of constitutional authority to act, as
opposed to evidence of acquiescence in another branch’s exercise of
authority, it may make sense to apply a more stringent test than the one
we are outlining here.88
B. Does Acquiescence Require Constitutional Agreement?
It is sometimes suggested by commentators that the third requirement
for gloss is more demanding than reasonable stability—in particular, that
the affected branch must have actually agreed that the practice is
constitutional.89 To understand why the third requirement is not best
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 29, Sanchez-Llamas
v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (Nos. 05-51 and 04-10566))); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (“[I]f . . . earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive power,
we would have reason to believe that the power was thought not to exist.”).
87
See Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 Duke L.J. 1407 (2017) (rejecting the
Supreme Court’s recent assertions that the novelty of a federal statute indicates its
inconsistency with constitutional principles of federalism or separation of powers, and
offering a variety of other reasons for congressional inaction); see also Curtis A. Bradley,
Historical Gloss, the Recognition Power, and Judicial Review, 109 Am. J. Int’l L. Unbound
2, 5–6 (2015) (doubting that the finding of a lack of congressional power in Zivotofsky was
supported by historical gloss as opposed to structural and consequentialist considerations);
Jack Goldsmith, Zivotofsky II as Precedent in the Executive Branch, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 112,
122–23 (2015) (critiquing that aspect of the Court’s reasoning in Zivotofsky); Neil S. Siegel,
Distinguishing the “Truly National” from the “Truly Local”: Customary Allocation,
Commercial Activity, and Collective Action, 62 Duke L.J. 797, 814, 815 (2012) (identifying
various possible reasons for congressional inaction and concluding that “courts are wrong to
presume that the unprecedented nature of an exercise of federal power renders the exercise
unconstitutional”); Ernest A. Young, Our Prescriptive Judicial Power: Constitutive and
Entrenchment Effects of Historical Practice in Federal Courts Law, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
535, 541, 591 (2016) (expressing concern about the use of historical gloss in Zivotofsky to
disable Congress from legislating); infra Subsection II.C.2 (identifying various possible
reasons for congressional inaction).
88
See infra note 114 (suggesting one potential component of such a test); cf. Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(suggesting that courts “scrutinize[] with caution” claims that Congress lacks the authority to
regulate presidential action).
89
See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, The Cost of “Empty Words”: A Comment on the Justice
Department’s Libya Opinion, Harv. Nat’l Security J.F., 2011, at 3, https://harvardnsj.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/13/2011/04/Forum_Glennon_Final-Version.pdf [http://perma.cc/VA76-E2Y3] (contending that, although “practice can affect the Constitution’s meaning and
allocation of power,” “[a] practice of constitutional dimension must be regarded by both
political branches as a juridical norm” before it does so); Roisman, supra note 69, at 709–10
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interpreted that way, it is useful to consider the principal justifications in
support of relying upon historical practice as it relates to the separation of
powers.
As one of us has previously outlined, a review of Supreme Court
decisions and other materials suggests that there are several general sets
of reasons for invoking gloss.90 One group of reasons concerns what has
been described as “Burkean consequentialism.” The idea is that
longstanding practices of government institutions are indicative of what
works well, or at least what works better than anything the judiciary is
likely to impose.91 Such practices reflect the realities of governance and
changes in the needs of governance, and therefore, the reasoning goes,
they have the potential to embody collective wisdom. Under that
rationale, the very persistence of a practice is evidence of its utility, and
deferring to it protects reliance interests, expectation interests, stability of
governance, and settlement.92 The emphasis here is less on constitutional
interpretation by political actors and more on the functional problems
associated with disturbing practices that have been working at least
reasonably well over time and that may reflect various compromises that
would be difficult to disentangle.93
The Court in Noel Canning relied heavily on such Burkean
consequentialist reasoning. In deferring to past practice concerning the
(contending that the only historical practice that should be credited is that which “is likely to
be indicative of constitutional agreement between the branches”).
90
See generally Bradley, supra note 21 (outlining potential justifications for judicial
application of gloss).
91
See id. at 66–67. For a discussion of the Court’s arguably contrary view in INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983), see infra note 226 and accompanying text.
92
One of us previously identified reliance interests as a separate set of reasons for crediting
gloss. See Bradley, supra note 21, at 67. But reliance interests are a kind of consequentialist
consideration and thus, for analytical simplicity, can be grouped under Burkean
consequentialism. Similarly, it is possible to break out the value of “settlement” as its own
justification. See Aziz Z. Huq, Fourth Amendment Gloss, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. 701, 717–18
(2019) (treating settlement as a separate justification for gloss). But that value is sufficiently
related to Burkean consequentialist arguments that we have included it under that label, again
for analytical simplicity.
93
See, e.g., Mitchell Pearsall Reich, Incomplete Designs, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 807, 831 (2016)
(“A Burkean-minded judge deciding whether to upset a settled interpretation of a clause
cannot contend just with history’s judgment that the interpretation of the clause itself is
correct. She must also recognize history’s judgment that numerous institutional decisions that
likely surround it—and which the judge may be unable to identify, let alone evaluate—are
useful, workable, and correct as well.”); Sunstein, supra note 39, at 401 (“If Congress and [the
President] have settled on certain accommodations, there is reason to believe that those
accommodations make institutional sense.”).
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scope of the President’s recess appointments power, the Court noted that
the frequent and longstanding use of recess appointments “suggests that
the Senate and President have recognized that recess appointments can be
both necessary and appropriate in certain circumstances.”94 The Court
thereby emphasized the shared view of the political branches on
workability rather than on constitutional interpretation. The Court also
stressed reliance interests, noting that it was concerned about “upset[ting]
the compromises and working arrangements that the elected branches of
Government themselves have reached,” as well as about “seriously
shrink[ing] the authority that Presidents have believed existed and have
exercised for so long.”95
A second set of reasons for invoking gloss concerns limits on
decisional capacity.96 Sometimes interpreters invoke practice because
other constitutional materials are perceived to offer insufficient
guidance.97 That may be especially likely with respect to questions of
executive power, given the limited textual guidance in Article II of the
Constitution and uncertainties about questions of original meaning, as
well as substantial changes in the nature of the presidency and
international affairs over time.98 For such issues, unless decisionmakers
abstain altogether, relying upon practice may offer the best option for a
reasoned disposition of the case that seeks to avoid appealing simply to a
policy assessment, partisan calculation, or “choosing a side” in a dispute
between the branches.
That sort of reasoning was also evident in Noel Canning. The Court
resorted to historical practice only after determining that the text of the
Recess Appointments Clause was doubly ambiguous.99 The Court also
94

134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014).
Id. at 2560, 2573.
96
Limits on judicial capacity—discussed in Bradley, supra note 21, at 65–66—are a subset
of limits on decisional capacity. It is not just judges who may find that historical practice is
the best available material. The OLC opinions quoted in the introduction to this Article, for
example, specifically invoke that consideration. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
97
See, e.g., Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2594 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(agreeing, while expressing reservations about practice-based arguments, that an “ambiguous
constitutional provision” is ripe for historical analysis (emphasis added)).
98
See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 417–18 (noting that Article II’s general language
has given rise to a reliance on practice-based arguments concerning the scope of presidential
power).
99
See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2561, 2568; see also id. at 2594 (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment) (acknowledging that textual ambiguity justifies resort to historical practice).
The question of whether the phrase “the Recess” in the Recess Appointments Clause includes
intra-session recesses or only inter-session recesses strikes us as genuinely ambiguous, just as
95
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emphasized the lack of judicial precedent, noting that “[w]e have not
previously interpreted the Clause” and that it was “doing so for the first
time in more than 200 years.”100 Moreover, in evaluating how the recess
appointments power worked during intra-session Senate breaks, original
understandings of the recess appointments power were of limited use
given that the Senate did not even begin taking significant intra-session
breaks until after the Civil War.101
Concerns about decisional capacity also explain why gloss reasoning
is especially evident with respect to issues relating to presidential power
in foreign affairs.102 The text of Article II is spare with respect to those
issues, and judicial precedent is also usually very limited. In part for those
reasons, historical practice is often the best material to explain the
President’s authority concerning matters such as recognizing foreign
states, concluding executive agreements, terminating treaties, and using
military force.103 Moreover, as a general matter, gloss is more likely to
thrive and be consulted in areas of law, like foreign affairs, where judicial
interventions are infrequent.104 Part of the reason is that when they have
the choice, courts tend to prioritize their own precedents and reasoning
over non-judicial materials. In addition, when there is frequent judicial
review, political actors tend to coordinate around the judicial decisions,
so such decisions are likely to disrupt the ongoing development of
practice that is required for gloss.105 None of that is to say, however, that
courts are always right to privilege their own decisions over political
branch practice. There can be good Burkean consequentialist reasons for
courts to pay close attention to such practice even when judicial precedent
is more common.
A third set of justifications for gloss concerns deference to the
constitutional interpretations of nonjudicial actors. The basic idea here is

references to “the printing press” or “the automobile” can mean one thing in particular or the
class of such things generally. As a purely textual matter, however, we are less confident than
the Court was that the phrase “Vacancies that may happen during the Recess” includes
vacancies that predate the Recess. On that issue, the Court’s finding of ambiguity may have
been affected by its desire not to contradict longstanding political branch practice. For a
discussion, see Bradley & Siegel, supra note 13, at 47–48.
100
Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2560.
101
See id. at 2564–65.
102
See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 417–21.
103
See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 55, at 38–39, 183–84.
104
See Bradley, supra note 21, at 68–69.
105
See id. at 69.
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a type of departmentalism,106 whereby the constitutional views of the
political branches are entitled to weight along with judicial
interpretations, especially when the political branches agree on an
interpretation. Among other things, deferring to such views can help
reduce the counter-majoritarian difficulty,107 which is particularly strong
when unelected judges overturn the longstanding positions of elected
representatives. Those deference justifications tend to emphasize the
views of the political branches about the constitutionality, and not just the
desirability, of the practice in question, and such justifications look for
whether a branch affected by a particular governmental practice
acquiesces in the practice.
Of the three types of justifications, only the deference justification
potentially requires an interbranch agreement about the meaning of the
Constitution. And even some variants of the deference idea do not depend
on a showing of agreement at the level of constitutional interpretation. In
particular, if one branch has long articulated a constitutional view about
the separation of powers and the other branch has been silent, it may not
be clear whether there is any agreement between the branches.
Nevertheless, the views of the branch that has maintained the position
may still be entitled to some deference, especially if those views have
been consistent and have reflected the positions of elected officials of both
major political parties. After all, as Justice Frankfurter observed in
Youngstown, longstanding executive practice is “engaged in by Presidents
who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution.”108 Similarly, in Noel
Canning, the Supreme Court gave weight to the fact that “the publicly
available opinions of Presidential legal advisers that we have found are
nearly unanimous in determining that the [Recess Appointments] Clause
authorizes” appointments during intra-session breaks.109
Moreover, even if it requires a showing of agreement with respect to
the meaning of the Constitution, the deference justification would not
necessarily require interbranch agreement about the constitutional text.
Instead, it could be premised on the idea that part of constitutional
reasoning is pragmatic (such as structural reasoning, as well as, of course,
106
Departmentalism “is the theory that each branch of government has the power to apply
its own interpretation of the Constitution to its own actions.” Daniel Farber & Neil S. Siegel,
United States Constitutional Law 27 (2019).
107
See supra text accompanying notes 42–44.
108
343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
109
134 S. Ct. 2550, 2562 (2014).
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consequentialist reasoning, which typically informs structural reasoning),
and that the political branches will have a better understanding than courts
do of the operational feasibility and desirability of particular separation
of powers arrangements. That idea seems to be reflected in the suggestion
that is sometimes made by the Supreme Court and executive branch
lawyers that gloss entails a “practical construction” of the Constitution.110
The more we accept that constitutional interpretation involves an exercise
in pragmatic judgment, the less we will require that the nonjudicial actors
have formulated understandings about the text or original understanding
of the Constitution, as opposed to what works well in helping the
constitutional system to function.
The other justifications for gloss have an even weaker connection to
any requirement of agreement with respect to constitutional meaning. For
example, Burkean consequentialism can support looking to historical
practice even absent any evidence of such agreement because of its focus
on the value of established ways of doing things and a concern about the
risks of change.111 Similarly, limits on decisional capacity can suggest
deferring to practice even if it does not clearly reflect a common
constitutional understanding of the political branches, because the
practice can still provide a type of precedent external to an interpreter’s
preferences or values.
An advantage of not requiring evidence of an interbranch agreement
about the meaning of the Constitution is that it is often unclear why a
legislature does what it does. Congress is a large “they,” not an “it,” and
there are problems of aggregation and attribution in discerning legislative
intent that are familiar to scholars of statutory interpretation.112 Moreover,
when discerning gloss, interpreters (such as the Court in Noel Canning
and Zivotofsky v. Kerry) often emphasize congressional inaction in
110

See, e.g., The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 675 (1929); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649,
691 (1892); see also, e.g., Whether Uruguay Round Agreements Required Ratification as a
Treaty, 18 Op. O.L.C. 232, 233 (1994) (noting that “a significant guide to the interpretation
of the Constitution’s requirements is the practical construction placed on it by the executive
and legislative branches acting together”).
111
Cf. Young, supra note 87, at 556–58 (noting that Burkean justifications for crediting
historical practice do not require a showing of agreement and instead look to whether the
practice is “subject to contention and dispute” (quoting 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries
*77)).
112
See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent
as Oxymoron, 12 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 239 (1992) (arguing that those engaged in statutory
interpretation should not rely on legislative intent because intent cannot necessarily be inferred
from legislative history).
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response to longstanding executive branch practice,113 yet it is often
impossible to know whether such inaction represents constitutional
agreement or is better attributed to other considerations.114 As applied,
therefore, the acquiescence component of gloss often has meant only
reasonable stability in the practice.
Many important governmental practices have become at least
reasonably well-settled without any clear evidence of an interbranch
agreement about the meaning of the Constitution. For example, it is not
evident that the recess appointments practices accepted in Noel Canning
were the product of such an agreement. The Court was content to observe
that, while some Senators had disagreed with the President’s position that
the Recess Appointments Clause allowed intra-session appointments, the
Senate as a body had not taken “formal action” to oppose the President’s
practices, which falls short of an actual agreement between the President
and the Senate about anything, let alone about the meaning of the
Constitution.115 Similarly, the Court noted that while the Senate had at
times opposed the President’s view that the recess appointments power
applied to vacancies that occurred before a recess, the Senate had
“subsequently abandoned its hostility,”116 which again falls short of an
agreement about constitutional meaning.
Another prominent example, from the foreign affairs area, is the
modern interchangeability of congressional-executive agreements with
the Article II treaty ratification process. Congressional-executive
agreements are international agreements concluded by the executive with
the authorization or approval of a majority of each house of Congress
rather than with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate.
113

See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s emphasis on
congressional inaction in Noel Canning and Zivotofsky).
114
Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 67, 69–
70 (1988) (arguing, in the statutory interpretation context, that “legislative inaction should
rarely be given much, or any, weight” as evidence of “the actual collective will or desire of
the enacting legislature”). We are focused here only on inaction as evidence of acquiescence
in another branch’s exercise of authority, not as evidence that the inactive branch itself lacks
authority to act. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. Before attributing the latter
significance to inaction, it might make sense to require evidence that the inaction has been the
result of perceived unconstitutionality. Cf. Bradley & Siegel, supra note 21, at 292–312
(documenting, in twentieth-century debates in Congress and the executive branch, expressions
of concern that stripping the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would be
unconstitutional).
115
Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2564 (2014).
116
Id. at 2572.
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Although not clearly authorized by the text of the Constitution,
congressional-executive agreements represent the vast majority of the
international agreements concluded by the United States since World War
II.117 Arguments about historical practice dominate discussions of these
agreements’ “interchangeability” with treaties.118 It is clear that there has
been much bipartisan practice and that such practice has been deemed
useful by both political branches. But it is not clear that there is an
interbranch agreement about the meaning of the Constitution’s Treaty
Clause, and at times there have been disputes between the Senate and the
executive branch about the extent of interchangeability of Article II
treaties and congressional-executive agreements.
Yet another example from the foreign affairs area, which we mentioned
in the Introduction, is presidential authority to use military force in the
absence of congressional authorization. The text of the Constitution
assigns a variety of war-related powers to Congress, including the
authority to declare war, and many scholars have concluded that the
original understanding of those provisions was that presidents would need
congressional authorization before ordering non-defensive uses of
military force.119 At least since World War II, however, Presidents have
often ordered small-scale or short-term uses of force that do not involve
self-defense, without seeking congressional authorization, and many
commentators have concluded that this practice must be given weight in
the constitutional analysis.120 But there is no clear interbranch agreement
on the constitutionality of the practice, and, indeed, Congress in the 1973
War Powers Resolution expressed a sharply different view of presidential
117

See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 468–76.
See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79
Tex. L. Rev. 961 (2001).
119
See, e.g., John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and
Its Aftermath 3 (1993) (arguing that the original understanding of the Constitution was that
“all wars, big or small, ‘declared’ in so many words or not . . . had to be legislatively
authorized” (footnote omitted)); Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1543, 1547 (2002) (concluding, based on textualist and originalist considerations, that
“Congress generally has the power to initiate hostilities”).
120
See, e.g., Louis Henkin, War Powers “Short of War,” 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 201, 204
(1995) (“History shows that Presidents have exercised authority to engage in ‘little wars,’ to
deploy forces ‘short of war,’ in a number of cases—a goodly number—of differing
importance.”); Peter J. Spiro, War Powers and the Sirens of Formalism, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1338, 1355 (1993) (reviewing Ely, supra note 119) (“Ultimately, war powers law does not
lend itself to refined parchment solutions. It is rather the ‘court of history,’ an accretion of
interactions among the branches, that gives rise to basic norms governing the branches’
behavior in the area.” (footnote omitted)).
118

COPYRIGHT © 2020 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

30

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 106:1

war powers authority than the one long maintained by the executive
branch.121
Additional examples of practice-based gloss in the absence of
constitutional agreement between two branches can be found when
considering the relationship between Congress and the federal judiciary,
which is another of the three coordinate branches. For example, the
permissibility of Congress’s use of non-Article III tribunals to adjudicate
cases that fall within the Article III judicial power (including in
administrative agencies) has been accepted by the Supreme Court (with
some modest limitations) based in part on longstanding practice. Yet the
Court has not suggested that it defers to such practice because of an
agreement with Congress about the meaning of Article III; instead, it has
indicated that it defers to such practice because it is longstanding.122
Similarly, the text of Article III can be read to suggest that Congress must
fully vest all of the nine categories of judicial power in the federal
courts,123 but that argument is viewed as a non-starter in large part due to
very long historical practice to the contrary.124 Again, however, it is not
clear that judicial deference to such practice is the result of any agreement
about the meaning of Article III.

121
See 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (2012) (“The constitutional powers of the President as
Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances,
are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or
(3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or
possessions, or its armed forces.”).
122
See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70 (1982)
(plurality opinion) (“In sum, this Court has identified three situations in which Art. III does
not bar the creation of legislative courts. In each of these situations, the Court has recognized
certain exceptional powers bestowed upon Congress by the Constitution or by historical
consensus.” (emphasis added)); see also Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 504–05 (2011)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“[A]n Article III judge is required in all federal adjudications, unless
there is a firmly established historical practice to the contrary.” (second emphasis added)).
For additional discussion of practice-based influences on the law of federal courts, see Young,
supra note 87.
123
The text of Article III provides that the federal judicial power “shall be vested.” U.S.
Const. art. III, § 1. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story construed that clause as requiring the
vesting of all the judicial power in the federal courts. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) 304, 331 (1816). Professor Akhil Amar has also advanced a version of that
argument. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205, 231–33 (1985); Akhil Reed Amar, The
Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499, 1503–05 (1990).
124
See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1569, 1628–31 (1990).
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***
In sum, under the historical gloss approach as we have described it,
when the Constitution is perceived to be unclear or indeterminate as it
relates to the separation of powers, longstanding governmental practices
that have proven to be stable are consulted to inform constitutional
interpretation. Those practices need not date to the early post-Founding
period, and they can still qualify as gloss even if they differ from earlier
practices. An interbranch agreement about constitutional meaning is not
required for gloss, although evidence of such an agreement will bolster
the case for the requisite stability.
C. Gloss’s Domain
Recall how Justice Frankfurter described the idea of “gloss” in
Youngstown: the actions and interactions of federal government
institutions over time can help resolve questions about the constitutional
scope of their respective authority. Under that conception, gloss would
primarily be relevant to questions relating to the separation of powers. In
this Section, we explain why resort to gloss is most defensible in that
context. This does not mean that reliance on historical practice is never
appropriate in other domains; rather, our claim is simply that resort to
practice is often less necessary outside the separation of powers context
and tends to raise additional concerns that would need to be addressed.
Nor do we mean to imply that there is always a clear division between
separation of powers issues, on the one hand, and federalism and
individual rights issues on the other, although we do think that those
commonly used categories are useful in many situations. Finally, we
acknowledge that reasonable minds can differ on the question of gloss’s
domain; we address it here not because it is essential to limit gloss to the
separation of powers context in order for it to be normatively attractive,
but rather because, if gloss were limited in that way, such a limitation
might provide an additional basis for distinguishing it from liquidation.
1. Separation of Powers. As noted in the previous Section, resort to
historical practice is often necessary in separation of powers controversies
given the paucity of alternative decisional materials. Part of the reason is
that there does not exist among judges and commentators a welldeveloped normative sense of the horizontal division and interrelation of
powers. The point is not simply that some jurists and scholars emphasize
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the values of efficiency and accountability while others emphasize the
importance of preserving individual liberty through a balance of powers
among the branches.125 More fundamentally, there is a widespread sense
of uncertainty about which values are most central, and the values that are
invoked in this context are often severely under-determinate (especially
the notion of “balance”).126 As a result, historical practice almost
inevitably plays a more significant role in resolving separation of powers
disputes than it does in resolving disputes that arise in other areas of
constitutional law.
Decisional capacity is also limited in the separation of powers context
because judicial precedent, textualism, and originalism are often of little
help. Judges tend either to avoid separation of powers controversies or
else to decide them narrowly, leaving little judicial precedent on point
when the next controversy arises.127 Relative to other areas of
constitutional law, justiciability doctrines such as standing requirements
and the political question doctrine are particularly robust in that context
(especially in the lower courts).128 As for textualism, Article II of the

125
See, e.g., Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of Checks and
Balances, 18 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 419, 481 (2015) (surveying the literature and identifying
liberty, efficacy, and accountability as the functions of the separation of powers identified by
different scholars and judges); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J.
1725, 1729–30 (1996) (identifying the objectives of the separation of powers as “balance
among the branches”; “responsibility or accountability to the electorate”; and “energetic,
efficient government”); see also Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also
contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government.”).
126
See M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law,
150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 603, 604–05 (2001) (“[I]t is a hopeless enterprise to talk about balance
among the branches of government. We have not come close to articulating a vision of what
an ideal balance would look like.”).
127
The hierarchical relationship between historical gloss and judicial precedent is interesting
and complex, and we cannot do it justice in this Article. In part because of modern norms of
judicial supremacy, gloss of the sort we are focused on is unlikely to arise in the face of
contrary judicial precedent. See Bradley, supra note 21, at 69. But if it does, that seems like at
least one argument against stare decisis, which is concerned in part with protecting reliance
interests. In any event, the scope of judicial precedent must be interpreted, and historical
practice is likely to be a factor in such interpretation.
128
For example, lower courts continue to apply the political question doctrine with some
frequency to cases concerning foreign relations and national security, many of which implicate
separation of powers questions. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 55, at 66–67. Although
not a foreign affairs case, the Supreme Court recently emphasized concerns about decisional
capacity in concluding that a constitutional challenge to partisan gerrymandering presented a
political question. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019). Whether
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Constitution is notoriously obscure in spelling out the boundaries of
executive power and how it interacts with legislative power. And
originalism is of limited help because the Founders simply could not have
imagined the nature of the modern presidency or the conditions under
which it operates. That reality prompted Justice Jackson to offer a
memorable observation in Youngstown:
A judge, like an executive adviser, may be surprised at the poverty
of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete
problems of executive power as they actually present themselves. Just
what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they
foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from materials almost as
enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for
Pharaoh.129

In addition, Burkean consequentialist and deference justifications for
gloss fit best with the separation of powers context. At least as a general
matter, the political branches are likely to have a better sense than the
courts of what works well in matters of governance, especially in the face
of substantially changed conditions. Moreover, because those branches
routinely interact and bargain with each other, their practices are
especially likely to reflect compromises and working adjustments that
may be difficult to disentangle when examining particular constitutional
issues in isolation.130 Finally, because the separation of powers context
implicates the interactions of coequal federal branches, each charged with
upholding and applying the Constitution, the case for judicial deference
to the product of their interactions is higher than the case for deference to
practice in other contexts.
2. Federalism. Gloss does not seem to be as well suited to issues of
federalism, where the practices in question are not of coequal branches
but rather of the national government and the constituent states. For one
those concerns are persuasive, however, is a distinct question, and the Justices fractured in
part over that question. See, e.g., id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
129
343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
130
Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1595, 1600
(2014) (offering “a descriptive and a normative account of institutional negotiation and its
limits”); John O. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and
War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 293, 294 (Autumn 1993) (suggesting that constitutional authority is “neither
indivisible nor immovable” and may be allotted according to the branch that has the most to
gain from its exercise).
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thing, relative to the separation of powers, there appears to exist among
many judges and commentators a more developed normative sense of the
primary role of the federal government in the constitutional scheme. Of
course, there are numerous heated disagreements in particular areas of
constitutional federalism, and there are robust disputes among courts and
commentators over whether preserving a prominent regulatory role for
the states advances various so-called “values of federalism,” including
individual liberty, political participation, accountability, responsiveness,
value pluralism, democratic experimentation, and local efficiency.131
Nonetheless, it is striking that an ideologically diverse array of
commentators has emphasized the role of the federal government in
solving problems that the states are not well situated to address on their
own, especially multistate collective action problems.132 Although fully
defending that claim would take this Article too far afield (and we are
bracketing here reasonable debates about what constitutes a collective
action problem), that basic intuition is supported by the historical
background out of which the Constitution arose (i.e., states acted
individually in the commercial and military spheres when they needed to
act collectively to solve national problems, conduct international
diplomacy, and defend the nation),133 and by the increasingly prominent
role of the federal government in American life since the 1930s in
131
For a discussion of the values of federalism, with citations to the literature, see generally
Neil S. Siegel, International Delegations and the Values of Federalism, 71 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 93, 96–99 (Winter 2008).
132
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 107–08 (2005); Jack
M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 6 (2010); Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. Troy,
Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of Congress’s Power to Regulate Commerce, 25 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 849, 852 (2002); Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and
Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, 780–81
(1995); Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Number of States and the Economics of
American Federalism, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 1 (2011); Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective
Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 115 (2010);
Richard E. Levy, Federalism and Collective Action, 45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1241 (1997); Donald
H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United
States v. Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 554, 609 (1995); Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which
Concerns More States Than One, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1335, 1336–37 (1934).
133
For a recent, detailed account of the causes of the collapse of the Articles of
Confederation, see generally George William Van Cleve, We Have Not a Government: The
Articles of Confederation and the Road to the Constitution (2017). See also, e.g., Amar, supra
note 132, at 44–47, 106–08 (cataloguing the problems with the Articles of Confederation);
Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 24–
28, 47–48, 167–68, 188–89 (1996) (same); Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 Harv.
L. Rev. 611, 616–23 (1999) (same).
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addressing races to the bottom, interstate externalities, and certain rights
violations.134 As Professors Steven Calabresi and Nicholas Terrell have
written, “[t]he most compelling argument in American history for
empowering our national government has been the need to overcome
collective action problems.”135
Historical practice, however, may have little correlation with what is
required today to enable the federal government to address collective
action problems. By definition, the states themselves have inadequate
incentives to solve multistate collective action problems by regulating on
their own. Their rationally self-interested incentives, rather, are to
externalize costs onto other states. Accordingly, as one of us has
previously noted, there may be a good deal of state regulation in an area
of traditional state concern, but “such regulation may be creating or
exacerbating multistate collective action problems, not solving them.”136
Moreover, the absence of a collective action problem may not explain
why federal regulation has long been absent. There may have been other
political priorities (including wars and depressions), or different social
values (on issues like environmental protection and civil rights). Perhaps
there were judicially imposed constraints on Congress (such as during the
Lochner era), or successful resistance to federal intervention by powerful
interests in Congress (like the Southern opposition that doomed federal
civil rights legislation in the twentieth century until 1964).137

134

Many federal laws, including statutes regulating securities, the environment, civil rights,
public health, and criminality, fit that description. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Free Riding on
Benevolence: Collective Action Federalism and the Minimum Coverage Provision, 75 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 29, 46–47 (2012) (defining collective action problems for the states and
discussing examples in the areas of environmental law and civil rights); see also Richard L.
Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2341, 2342
(1996) (“The two justifications most prominently offered . . . for environmental regulation at
the federal level focus on the existence of a ‘race to the bottom’ and of interstate
externalities.”).
135
Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 132, at 6. Ameliorating collective action problems is
obviously not the only function of the federal government. It also plays a vital role in
protecting individual rights, as illustrated in part by the amendments that were added to the
Constitution after the Civil War and during the twentieth century. See U.S. Const. amends.
XIII, XIV, XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
136
See Siegel, supra note 87, at 813–14.
137
See id. at 814. For a collective action analysis of some of those examples, see Siegel,
supra note 134, at 46–47. For the legislative story of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey & Elizabeth Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation:
Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 2–23 (4th ed. 2007).
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Furthermore, the scope of collective action problems is likely to change
over time.138 A good example of changed conditions is the importance of
education to economic productivity in an information economy with easy
interstate mobility due to improved transportation networks.139 Whatever
may have been the scope of certain problems in the past, significant
changes in society, the economy, and technology may mean that the scope
of those problems is interstate in the present.140 The customary allocation
of regulatory authority between the federal government and the states is
unlikely to track the existence of significant problems of collective action
facing the states—however preferable reliance on custom may be to costbenefit calculations in other settings.141
Finally, in the federalism area, structural reasoning and judicial
precedent abound, and originalist argumentation also plays a role. Indeed,
invocations of historical practice in federalism cases are typically
secondary to those other modalities of constitutional interpretation.
Prominent examples of federalism decisions that emphasize those other
modalities include McCulloch v. Maryland142 and United States v.
Lopez.143
138

See Siegel, supra note 87, at 814.
For a discussion of potential spillover effects on other states in such circumstances, see
Balkin, supra note 50, at 172–73.
140
See id. at 172 (“If an area of concern has significant spillover effects on other states, or
begins to do so, it shouldn’t matter that it was the traditional concern of state regulation.”).
For a more general discussion of why it is problematic to assume that novelty of a federal
statute renders it constitutionally suspect, see generally Litman, supra note 87.
141
See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T. J. Hooper: The Theory and History
of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. Legal Stud. 1, 4 (1992) (“[G]iven the imperfections of the
legal system, the conventional wisdom that places cost-benefit analysis first and custom
second [in the law of negligence] is incorrect . . . .”).
142
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402 (1819) (“These observations [about historical practice]
belong to the cause; but they are not made under the impression that, were the question entirely
new, the law would be found irreconcilable with the constitution.”); see also Charles L. Black,
Jr., Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law 15 (1969) (“In [McCulloch], perhaps the
greatest of our constitutional cases, judgment is reached not fundamentally on the basis of that
kind of textual exegesis which we tend to regard as normal, but on the basis of reasoning from
the total structure which the text has created.”). For further discussion of the Court’s reasoning
in McCulloch, see infra notes 275–283 and accompanying text.
143
514 U.S. 549, 561–64 (1995) (emphasizing that criminal law and education are
traditional subjects of state regulation only after deciding the case on the ground that Congress
was regulating noneconomic activity); see also Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism:
United States v. Lopez, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 125, 205–06 (writing of the Lopez Court’s
invocation of traditional subjects of state regulation that “it is too late in this game to forgive
the Court for this move” because “over and over, in a wide range of federalism contexts, just
this line has proved itself Maginot”); Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The
139
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3. Individual Rights. As Chief Justice Marshall appeared to sense in
McCulloch, reliance on historical practice is most questionable in
individual rights cases. In beginning his opinion in McCulloch by
invoking historical practice, he offered the caveat that “the great
principles of liberty are not concerned.”144 Although he did not explain
that qualification, he presumably assumed that how the political branches
and the states traditionally interacted with one another raised different
normative questions from how they interacted with private citizens.
One obvious potential difference between individual rights cases and
structural cases is that individual rights cases can implicate concerns,
generally not present in structural cases, about popular majorities
continuing to oppress unpopular minorities. In addition, the practice
potentially relevant to individual rights controversies tends to be different
in kind from what is relevant to structural disputes. In particular, whereas
the focus in structural disputes is on the practices of governmental
institutions, individual rights cases involve the effects of general social
practices or beliefs on individuals—that is, the effects of “traditions”
more broadly conceived.145
To be sure, arguments from tradition are common, and at times highly
controversial, in certain individual rights controversies.146 Subject matter
areas in which tradition may be invoked include capital punishment, the
Establishment Clause, gun rights, and substantive due process.147 In such
controversies, whether consulting tradition is normatively attractive is
Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 253, 335
(criticizing “the indeterminacy of any approach that tries to divide up the world into spheres
of state and federal primacy”).
144
17 U.S. at 401.
145
See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 416.
146
See generally Rebecca L. Brown, Essay, Tradition and Insight, 103 Yale L.J. 177, 183
(1993) (“Tradition has become one of the few sources of authority in constitutional
interpretation that ostensibly need no justification.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Sodomy and
Guns: Tradition as Democratic Deliberation and Constitutional Interpretation, 32 Harv. J.L.
& Pub. Pol’y 193 (2009); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Tradition as Justification: The Case of OppositeSex Marriage, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 281 (2011) (noting that respect for tradition was often used
to justify the ban on same-sex marriage and questioning the persuasiveness of such arguments
from tradition); Michael W. McConnell, Time, Institutions, and Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. Rev.
1745, 1775–76 (2015); Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A
Theory of Constitutional “Interpretation,” 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 551 (1985).
147
See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731–32 (2015) (capital punishment); Town
of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1825 (2014) (Establishment Clause); McDonald v.
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767–68 (2010) (Second Amendment incorporation);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997) (substantive due process).
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likely to divide courts and commentators ideologically and
methodologically. Those who are concerned that past mistreatment of
vulnerable individuals and groups risks furnishing its own justification
for continuing to mistreat such individuals and groups will not think
significant weight should be placed on tradition in individual rights
controversies, at least as a general matter.148 Those who believe that
conventional societal morality should significantly inform the scope of
individual rights will likely disagree.149 Such disagreement reflects a
more basic disagreement about the purposes that certain rights provisions
exist to accomplish. The key point here, however, is that looking to
tradition in that way is a different enterprise from looking to the historical
practice that is considered relevant under the historical gloss approach.
Although the categories of public action and private action are often not
clearly distinct, governmental actors in the rights context typically
interact with those who possess far less power than the government to
push back or advance contrary understandings. As a result, the
institutional deference and Burkean consequentialist justifications for
relying on practice are weaker in that context.150
It also seems less necessary to rely upon historical practice in many
individual rights cases, given the availability of alternative decisional
materials beyond the personal preferences or values of the interpreter.
Those materials primarily include judicial precedent, which is typically
plentiful. When such precedent is unavailable or is thought to be
insufficiently persuasive to be followed, courts and commentators
sometimes can investigate the original meaning of the constitutional
provision at issue.151 Alternatively, if one is not of an originalist bent, or
148

See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (“If rights were defined by
who exercised them in the past, then received practices could serve as their own continued
justification and new groups could not invoke rights once denied.”); see also Sunstein, supra
note 39, at 400 (“Under some constitutional provisions, above all the Equal Protection Clause,
the Burkean [tradition-based] approach is hard or perhaps impossible to square with
entrenched understandings in American constitutional law . . . .”).
149
See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 146, at 1775–76 (arguing that rights should be protected
under substantive due process only if they are objectively, deeply rooted in American history
and tradition).
150
Cf. Huq, supra note 92, at 758–59 (arguing that the justifications for relying on gloss in
the separation of powers context do not support relying on historical practice in the Fourth
Amendment context).
151
See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 600–05 (2008) (holding on
originalist and other grounds that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to
possess a firearm, including a handgun, in the home for purposes of self-defense).
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if original meaning has run out, one can seek to discern the basic purpose
or structural function of the provision in the constitutional scheme.152
In sum, the most defensible domain for the historical gloss approach is
in the area of separation of powers. To be sure, some of the arguments for
relying upon historical practice in that context might also apply in some
federalism and individual rights controversies. Moreover, there is not
always a perfectly neat division among the three contexts,153 and there
may be relevant distinctions among different cases falling within a
particular context.154 But some of the arguments for historical practice are
specific to the separation of powers context, and extending such practice
to other areas at least raises additional normative concerns.
III. LIQUIDATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO GLOSS
Over the past two decades, a small number of originalist scholars have
become interested in the concept of “liquidation,” which would allow
post-Founding historical practice to resolve indeterminacies in the
Constitution’s original meaning and thereby “fix” its meaning.155 That
idea is frequently ascribed to James Madison based on statements he made
152

See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (asserting that “[t]he central
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of
official conduct discriminating on the basis of race”); Heller, 554 U.S. at 637, 661–62
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the structural function of the Second Amendment is to
prevent Congress from disarming the state militias).
153
To take the example in which the lines are perhaps the most blurred, constitutional
questions about the scope of congressional power under the Reconstruction Amendments have
a separation of powers dimension (because part of what is at stake is which branch controls
the meaning of those amendments); a federalism dimension (because the broader one
construes congressional power, the more state law is preempted); and an individual rights
dimension (because the scope of congressional power is related to the content of the rights
thought to be protected by the first section of each amendment). For discussions of the
relationships among those three dimensions in Section Five cases, see, for example, Robert C.
Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric
Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale L.J. 1943, 1946–47 (2003), and
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric
Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 Ind. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2003).
154
For example, there are many different kinds of constitutional federalism questions, some
of which have nothing to do with the existence or scope of collective action problems. There
is no reason to assume that historical practice is equally relevant or irrelevant to all such
questions.
155
Such indeterminacies include instances of ambiguity and vagueness. Ambiguity exists
when a text could mean more than one specific thing, while vagueness exists when the
applicability of the text to particular circumstances is unclear. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum,
The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 Const. Comment. 95, 97–98 (2010).
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in The Federalist and in later writings. Madison never presented a detailed
explanation of the idea, and it has received only limited, albeit increasing,
attention in the academic literature. As a result, it is not entirely clear
whether and to what extent the concept of liquidation differs from the
historical gloss approach. Indeed, as we noted in the Introduction, the
majority in Noel Canning seemed to treat liquidation and gloss as the
same phenomenon.156
As we have observed elsewhere,157 there are a number of uncertainties
concerning the theory of liquidation. One such uncertainty is whether the
settlement of constitutional meaning may occur only through early postFounding practice, or whether it also may occur through later practice
long after the Founding—and, if the latter, how likely it is that a
settlement long after the Founding could take place. It is also unclear
whether, under the liquidation theory, an initial settlement through
liquidation may be undone by a subsequent settlement through a new
liquidation. How one answers those questions will go a long way toward
determining how much difference there is between the liquidation
approach and the historical gloss approach.
Until recently, Professor Caleb Nelson had presented the only
extensive academic account of the liquidation theory, and his analysis was
often referenced by others when discussing the concept.158 In seeking to
explain why originalism does not “self-destruct” as a result of evidence
that the Founders themselves expected constitutional meaning to evolve,
Nelson contends that the Founders had in mind the concept of liquidation,
pursuant to which constitutional meaning would become “fixed” through
practice in a way that would not lead to “a perpetually evolving”
Constitution.159
Nelson was focused more on setting out the historical foundation for
the liquidation approach than on fleshing out its operational details, and

156

See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014) (citing a variety of decisions,
some that have endorsed gloss, for the proposition that “our cases have continually confirmed
Madison’s view”).
157
See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 13, at 29–30.
158
See, e.g., Randy Barnett, Liquid Constitutionalism, The Volokh Conspiracy (Apr. 13,
2017) (“[O]riginalists (and nonoriginalists) have been seriously examining the concept of
‘liquidating’ meaning for quite a long time: at least since Caleb Nelson’s 2001 article, Stare
Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2001).”), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/04/13/liquid-constitutionalism/ [https://perma.cc/C8TV-ALZM].
159
See, e.g., Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, supra note 29, at 521.
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he was writing before the recent academic literature on gloss. As a result,
it is not clear how broadly he conceived of the concept, or, relatedly, the
extent to which his conception of liquidation differs from gloss. There are
suggestions in what he wrote, however, of a fairly constrained conception
of the concept of liquidation. For example, he emphasized that Founders
like Madison believed that early constitutional interpretations, such as
about the scope of the President’s removal power, should become
“permanent” expositions of constitutional meaning.160 The focus of
Nelson’s account was on practices and debates in the early years of the
nation, and, more importantly, on the permanent “fixation” of
constitutional meaning through such practices and debates.
Another originalist scholar, Professor William Baude, has recently
presented a more detailed and contemporary account of liquidation.
Baude makes clear that, under his account, liquidation is not limited to
early practices, and that the first liquidation may be undone through
subsequent liquidation.161 Baude does not contend that his account is
necessarily broader than Nelson’s, although he suggests that it might be,
particularly with respect to the possibility of re-liquidation.162 Because we
are uncertain about Nelson’s views, we will refer in our analysis to a
“narrow” view of liquidation without specifically attributing it to Nelson
and to a “broader” view that we will attribute to Baude. Our aim is simply
to highlight different possible ways of conceiving of liquidation, each of
which presents difficult tradeoffs, not to create a contrast between Nelson
and Baude in particular.
We argue that a narrow account of liquidation successfully
distinguishes liquidation from gloss, but that it does so in ways that are
normatively problematic. We then argue that, although Baude’s broader
account of liquidation responds to some of our normative concerns by
diminishing the distinction between liquidation and gloss, significant
differences remain that continue to raise normative problems for
liquidation. Those normative problems should matter to originalists and
non-originalists alike who seek to address indeterminacies in the
constitutional text by resorting to post-Founding practice. Even for most
originalists, the proper scope of that gap-filling enterprise, whether it is
referred to as “constitutional construction” or part of “constitutional

160

See id. at 527–29.
See generally Baude, supra note 30.
162
See id. at 53–54.
161
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interpretation,” is a normative question that cannot itself be determined
by the original meaning of the text.163
A. The Narrow Account: Normatively Attractive?
1. A Narrow Account of Liquidation. One reason why originalist
scholars might look to early post-Founding practice is that it might
provide evidence of how the Constitution was understood by those who
lived during the time when it was written and approved.164 Some
originalist scholars, however, have suggested that such practice might be
relevant in a different way. Instead of looking to early practice as evidence
of original meaning, those scholars attribute to the Founders the
recognition that the constitutional text did not settle certain questions of
constitutional meaning and that the answers to those questions would
need to be worked out, or “liquidated,” through decisions and practices.165
163

The exception is “original methods originalists,” who insist that constitutional
methodologies used today must be those that would have been used by the Founders. See infra
note 300 and accompanying text. This Article does not attempt to engage with possible
Founding understandings about constitutional methodology other than to raise questions in
Part IV about whether the liquidation theory is properly attributed to James Madison.
164
See Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause,
52 UCLA L. Rev. 1487, 1537 (2005) (“Early interpretations evidence the original meaning of
the Constitution because it is thought that early interpreters were likely to understand the
meaning of the constitutional language and the context in which it was enacted.”); see also,
e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605 (2008) (describing “the examination of
a variety of legal and other sources to determine the public understanding of a legal text in the
period after its enactment or ratification” as “a critical tool of constitutional interpretation”).
165
See, e.g., Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, supra note 29, at 525–53;
Caleb Nelson, The Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 125 Yale L.J. 2446, 2453 (2016)
(“[L]eading members of the Founding generation anticipated that post-Founding practices or
precedents would settle on one of the permissible interpretations of provisions that lent
themselves to multiple readings. In the absence of ‘extraordinary and peculiar circumstances,’
moreover, those liquidations were expected to be permanent . . . .” (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), in 4 Letters and
Other Writings of James Madison 183, 185 (New York, R. Worthington 1884))); see also
Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution’s Accommodation of Social Change, 88 Mich. L. Rev.
239, 309 (1989) (suggesting that Madison “expected vagueness in the Constitution to be
resolved and made certain rather than that it would be an opportunity for flexibility and judicial
adaptation of the Constitution to changing exigencies”). Without specifically endorsing the
liquidation thesis, Professor Akhil Amar has argued that a number of the institutional practices
of the Washington administration have had lasting precedential effect on understandings of
presidential authority. See Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution: The
Precedents and Principles We Live By 307–32 (2012). Our colleague Stephen Sachs reads
Amar’s argument as embracing the idea of liquidation through early practice. See Stephen E.
Sachs, The “Unwritten Constitution” and Unwritten Law, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1797, 1806–08.
In the next chapter of his book, however, Amar goes on to discuss how institutional practices
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Once liquidated, the argument goes, the meaning of the Constitution on
those questions would become “fixed” and so not subject to change.
The idea of liquidation through initial practice is most frequently
associated with a statement made by James Madison in Federalist No. 37.
“All new laws,” he wrote in that essay, “though penned with the greatest
technical skill and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are
considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be
liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and
adjudications.”166 As that passage makes clear, Madison was not tying
liquidation specifically to constitutional interpretation; he was simply
observing that it was something that one should expect with all new laws
(including statutory law and the common law). Hamilton also made
references to “liquidation” in The Federalist, similarly without suggesting
that it was something specific to the Constitution.167
Professor Nelson argues that, when Founders such as Madison referred
to the possibility that post-Founding practice would “fix” constitutional
meaning, they were using that term in a manner similar to those who, like
the famous Anglo-Irish satirist Jonathan Swift, had advocated “fixing”
the English language so that its meaning would not change over time.168
The possibility of preventing change in the meaning of language was
controversial in eighteenth-century England, and Nelson notes that many
Americans of the Founding generation probably assumed that change in
of Congress, the Supreme Court, and administrative agencies, including practices long after
the Founding, “gloss and clarify the text, inducing interpreters to read the otherwise
indeterminate text in a highly determinate way.” Amar, supra, at 335.
166
The Federalist No. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Madison
also referred to the liquidation idea in later writings, albeit decades after the Founding. See,
e.g., Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 The Writings of James
Madison 447, 450 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908).
167
Alexander Hamilton observed in Federalist No. 78 that, when two statutes conflict, “it
is the province of the courts to liquidate and fix their meaning and operation.” The Federalist
No. 78, supra note 166, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton); see also The Federalist No. 22, supra
note 166, at 150 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and
define their true meaning and operation.”); The Federalist No. 82, supra note 166, at 491
(Alexander Hamilton) (“’Tis time only that can mature and perfect so compound a system,
can liquidate the meaning of all the parts, and can adjust them to each other in a harmonious
and consistent WHOLE.”).
168
See Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, supra note 29, at 530–35.
Historian Jonathan Gienapp observes that “language itself had become an urgent problem in
many corners of the eighteenth century as the prospect of linguistic instability haunted
rhetoricians, grammarians, and philosophers alike.” Gienapp, supra note 31, at 42; see also id.
at 42–45 (discussing the epistemological concerns of Jonathan Swift, Samuel Johnson,
Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke).
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language was inevitable. But Nelson observes that “[w]hatever their
position on this issue . . . Americans certainly were familiar with the idea
of ‘fixing’ the language, and they associated this concept with
permanence and immutability.”169 Madison’s references to “fixing” the
meaning of the Constitution, Nelson contends, must be understood in that
context: “Although Madison conceded that the words used in the
Constitution might well fall out of favor or acquire new shades of
meaning in later usage, he was suggesting that their meaning in the
Constitution would not change; once that meaning was ‘fixed,’ it should
endure.”170 As Nelson explains, regardless of whether the Founders
viewed the liquidation process as part of the original meaning of the
Constitution (thus binding as a matter of originalism today) or something
associated with the background “general” law in existence at the time
(thus not necessarily binding as a matter of originalism today), the basic
idea of liquidation remained the same: the Founders expected that
governmental actors and the courts after the Founding period would
resolve indeterminacies in the original meaning of the Constitution, and
that once they did so the meaning would become fixed.171
As an aside, it is worth noting that this conception of liquidation goes
beyond what might be entailed by analogizing the Swift-ian idea of fixing
linguistic meaning to constitutional interpretation. Such an analogy might
simply suggest that the meaning of specific words in the Constitution
should not change merely because usages of language change. But no one
contends otherwise, and that is not where the debate between originalists
and non-originalists is centered. The idea of constitutional liquidation is
different: it is that the meaning of linguistically indeterminate provisions,
and potentially also structural inferences from those provisions, can be
settled by post-Founding practice.

169
See Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, supra note 29, at 534–35; see also
Gienapp, supra note 31, at 45 (“These far-ranging meditations on the perils of linguistic
instability informed colonial American intellectual life. The works of Swift, Johnson, Locke,
and others were well known . . . .”).
170
Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, supra note 29, at 535.
171
Id. at 551–53. Even if that approach is not binding as a matter of originalism today,
Nelson notes that originalists might choose to follow it because “continuing to adhere to
settled liquidations may help to promote the same sort of stability that attracts some people to
originalism in the first place.” Id. at 550 n.136. For discussion of how “constitutional
backdrops” might have contemporary legal force even if not part of the original meaning of
the constitutional text, see Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
1813 (2012).
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As we noted above, because Nelson was focused primarily on
explaining the general idea of liquidation and its historical foundation, he
did not seek to lay out all of its operational details. Moreover, he was
writing before the recent academic literature on gloss, so he would not
have had any reason to identify potential differences between liquidation
and gloss. It is possible to read Nelson as having a circumscribed
conception of liquidation that would be readily distinguishable from
gloss, but whether he holds such a conception is not clear from what he
wrote. For this Article’s purposes, what is important is not his specific
position but rather the implications of what we will call a “narrow” view
of liquidation—one that focuses primarily on early historical practice, and
that disallows re-liquidation of constitutional meaning once the meaning
has become “fixed” through practice.
It is easy to see why a narrow account of liquidation might be attractive
to at least some originalists. For one thing, it tells interpreters where to
look for evidence of constitutional meaning when indeterminacies in the
text render it impossible to discern the original meaning—typically, in
early post-Founding deliberations or decisions. For another thing, by
“fixing” the meaning, the account avoids the possibility that constitutional
meaning might change over time absent a constitutional amendment. We
assume for now (and question later) that the two elements of the
approach—looking only (or primarily) to initial practice and decisions
and disallowing a subsequent interpretation that contradicts the one
reflected in initial practice172—follow from Madison’s statements. Even
if that is the case, we contend that those two elements are normatively
problematic along a number of dimensions.
2. Problems with the Narrow Account of Liquidation. Assuming it
could be shown that Madison did have in mind an approach whereby
172

See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical
as It Sounds, 22 Const. Comment 257, 267 (2005) (understanding the liquidation concept as
presented by Nelson to mean that “very early decisions and practices can ‘fix’ the original
meaning of the text where the text is open-ended and, once fixed, this meaning cannot then be
trumped by later judicial decision”); Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism,
110 Colum. L. Rev. 731, 786 (2010) (“Acknowledging that some constitutional provisions
would require future liquidation, many prominent originalists, however, would accept only
those liquidating precedents that arose close in time to the founding.”); Michael B. Rappaport,
Why Non-Originalism Does Not Justify Departing from the Original Meaning of the Recess
Appointments Clause, 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub Pol’y 889, 893 n.8 (2015) (“If there is an early
series of decisions that are consistent, which are then followed by a later series of decisions
that adopt a different view, then it is by no means clear that the later series can liquidate the
meaning.”).
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indeterminacies in original meaning could be settled by, and only by,
initial practice, and assuming it could further be shown that some (or
many or most) other Founders shared Madison’s view, those
demonstrations would not themselves establish that constitutional
interpreters today should accept such an approach. As careful originalists
like Nelson acknowledge, originalism cannot establish its own validity.173
A normative defense of the liquidation approach narrowly defined would
need to address substantial objections.
The theory behind the liquidation idea, to reiterate, is that the Founders
expected that indeterminacies in constitutional meaning would be
resolved by subsequent governmental actors.174 It is unclear, however,
why it would have made sense for the Founders to decide that
constitutional meaning should be determined dispositively by the
particular political alignments that happened to exist whenever the issue
arose the first time or subsequent times. In attempting to determine
constitutional meaning, the initial generations of political actors
presumably would be no less self-serving, partisan, and potentially shortsighted than later generations, and they would have much less experience
in apprehending the needs of American governance.175 While there was
173

See, e.g., Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, supra note 29, at 547–48.
Modern variants of originalism, unlike the first generation of originalist scholarship, focus on
the original meaning of the Constitution rather than on original intent. See, e.g., Keith E.
Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 375, 380–82 (2013).
That shift in focus further complicates any claim that a liquidation approach to the Constitution
should be followed because Founders such as James Madison intended it. To be sure,
considerations of intent and meaning may not be neatly separable, so it might be argued (for
example) that liquidation was part of the background understandings about how the
Constitution would operate. Cf. Sachs, supra note 171 (explaining that certain background
rules of law both have continuing legal force and are insulated by the text from change). Again,
however, even if that could be shown, it would not by itself establish that liquidation should
be followed.
174
See Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, supra note 29, at 547.
175
A principal theme of the Federalist Papers is the importance of learning the lessons of
experience. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 14, supra note 166, at 104 (James Madison) (“Is it
not the glory of the people of America that, whilst they have paid a decent regard to the
opinions of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for
antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the
knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience?”). The Federalist
Papers do not suggest that the need to learn from experience would expire with the ratification
of the Constitution. Years later, another Founder, Thomas Jefferson, observed that learning
from experience was, if anything, even more important after the Constitution’s ratification.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 10 The Papers of
Thomas Jefferson: Retirement Series 222, 226 (J. Jefferson Looney ed., 2013) (“[The time of
the Founding] was very like the present, but without the experience of the present: and 40[]
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often talk of the importance of civic virtue in the Founding period,176 the
politics of the time were acrimonious, and the debates over ratification of
the Constitution displayed sharp disagreements over basic issues such as
the proper scope of national government power.177 Moreover, the initial
post-Founding generations obviously lacked knowledge of subsequent
changes in conditions and values that could dramatically affect the
implications of adopting one interpretation of the Constitution instead of
another. Notwithstanding those substantial limitations, a narrow account
of liquidation would license earlier generations of politicians to bind more
experienced successors through simple majoritarian politics.
Those objections are not overcome by positing that liquidation should
be limited to situations in which the earlier generations deliberated with
unusual seriousness.178 Even if one could identify a way to distinguish
different levels of congressional or executive branch seriousness, the
more fundamental problem would remain that subsequent generations
might deliberate at least as seriously and they would necessarily possess
substantially more knowledge and experience.179 The net effect of
widespread acceptance of the narrow version of the liquidation idea
would be a regime that possesses many of the “dead hand” disadvantages
of originalism but few of the theory’s asserted upsides—namely,
preventing
constitutional
change
outside
the
demanding
supermajoritarian process of Article V and conferring democratic
legitimacy upon the institution of judicial review by limiting it to
enforcement of the original supermajoritarian act of higher lawmaking.
Another problem with an originalist embrace of a narrow account of
liquidation is that, by potentially disregarding settled modern practices, it
years of experience in government is worth a century of book-reading: and this they would
say themselves, were they to rise from the dead.”).
176
See, e.g., The Federalist No. 57, supra note 166, at 350 (James Madison) (“The aim of
every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most
wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next
place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to
hold their public trust.”).
177
For a discussion, see generally Rakove, supra note 133 (detailing the central arguments
and aims of the Federalists and Anti-Federalists during the debate over ratification).
178
See Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, supra note 29, at 528.
179
Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415–16 (1819) (“This provision is
made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted
to the various crises of human affairs. . . . To have declared that the best means shall not be
used, but those alone without which the power given would be nugatory, would have been to
deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and
to accommodate its legislation to circumstances.”).
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would be in tension with the acceptance by many originalists of judicial
precedent, as discussed in Part I. Justice Scalia, for example, made clear
that he accepted the presumptively binding force of precedent in a number
of areas of constitutional law.180 He described his approach to precedent
as a pragmatic “exception” to his originalism that was based on interests
in stability.181 Similarly, Judge Robert Bork accepted that a decision “may
be clearly incorrect but nevertheless have become so embedded in the life
of the nation, so accepted by the society, so fundamental to the private
and public expectations of individuals and institutions, that the result
should not be changed now.”182 But, as emphasized above,183 interests in
stability and related rule-of-law considerations, such as consistency,
predictability, reliance, and transparency, can also be advanced by
adhering to longstanding practices, regardless of whether they date to the
early post-Founding period, and regardless of whether they were the
initial practices.184
Other originalists like Professor Randy Barnett have suggested that
deference to judicial precedent can be reconciled with originalism based
in part on the idea of constitutional construction. As Barnett notes, “an
original meaning originalist can take the abstract meaning as given, and
accept that the application of this vague meaning to particular cases is left
to future actors, including judges, to decide.”185 But, as that sentence
implies, the “future actors” need not be judges and could instead be
political actors developing historical practice. Madison, it is worth
underscoring, grouped judicial precedent and political practices
together.186 Indeed, even when referring to “adjudications” of
180

See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“Despite my misgivings about substantive due process as an original matter, I have
acquiesced in the Court’s incorporation of certain guarantees in the Bill of Rights ‘because it
is both long established and narrowly limited.’” (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
275 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring))).
181
See Scalia, supra note 62, at 139–40.
182
Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 158
(1990).
183
See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
184
See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 427–28; Cass R. Sunstein, Originalism v.
Burkeanism: A Dialogue over Recess, 126 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 126, 128 (2013); see also
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional
Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 570, 588 (2001) (noting that stare decisis “promotes stability,
protects settled expectations, and conserves judicial resources”).
185
Barnett, supra note 172, at 264.
186
See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), in 4 Letters
and Other Writings of James Madison 183, 184–86 (New York, R. Worthington 1884)
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constitutional meaning,187 it is unlikely that he was referring only or
primarily to judicial determinations, as opposed to legislative ones.
Among other things, he was writing in the late eighteenth century, long
before modern notions of judicial supremacy, at a time when most major
constitutional questions were settled outside the courts.
In any case, if “liquidation” based on practice is like the development
of judicial precedent, it should potentially include modern practice and be
subject to revision.188 Many scholars—and particularly many
originalists—believe that the Supreme Court should at least sometimes be
willing to overrule its precedents when they conflict with what those same
scholars understand to be the “proper” interpretation of the Constitution.
If the Supreme Court can be wrong the first time it interprets the
Constitution, surely the political branches can also be wrong the first time
or two they interpret the Constitution, even if that interpretation initially
becomes settled. Consider, for example, the Judiciary Act of 1802, which
reflected the Jeffersonian conviction that it was constitutionally
permissible to end the tenure of Article III judges by abolishing their
courts. The Jeffersonian view was not subsequently regarded as the final
word on the meaning of the “good Behaviour” protection for judicial
independence in Section One of Article III.189
There are, to be sure, statements in a number of Supreme Court
decisions suggesting that practices dating back to near the Founding can
“fix[] the construction” to be given to constitutional provisions.190 Those
(analogizing respect for past political practices to judicial deference to precedent). As
discussed in Part I, see supra note 63 and accompanying text, some originalists accept judicial
precedent not as a pragmatic exception to originalism but as part of Article III judicial power,
and so in that way might be able to reconcile an acceptance of judicial precedent with a
rejection of nonjudicial precedent, depending on their grounds for accepting certain judicial
precedents and not others, and also depending on whether consideration of nonjudicial
precedent is part of the Article III judicial power.
187
See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
188
When discussing the concept of liquidation as applied to judicial precedent, Professor
Nelson has suggested that subsequent interpreters could reject a precedent if they “remained
convinced that a prior construction went beyond the range of indeterminacy.” Nelson, Stare
Decisis, supra note 29, at 14. In other words, under his account, a liquidation could be revisited
if, but only if, subsequent interpreters concluded that it had not been an appropriate matter for
liquidation in the first place. Within the zone of permissible liquidation, however, the views
of early interpreters would be treated as dispositive.
189
For discussion of that history, see Grove, supra note 27, at 473–88.
190
See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927) (“So, when their practice in the
matter is appraised according to the circumstances in which it was begun and to those in which
it has been continued, it falls nothing short of a practical construction, long continued, of the
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statements, however, do not contend that this is the only way in which
constitutional meaning may legitimately be affected by practice.
Moreover, those statements do not envision that meaning would become
fixed merely as a result of the initial practice; rather, they expressly
require longstanding acquiescence in the interpretation that was adopted.
That is also true of Justice Scalia’s acknowledgment in Noel Canning that
it would be appropriate to look to practices “unchallenged since the early
days of the Republic.”191 As a result, those statements do not suggest that
the initial post-Founding generation was expected to have the authority to
fix constitutional meaning. Instead, the statements suggest that meaning
would become fixed only if later generations continued to accept the early
interpretation. The idea of fixation through longstanding acceptance of a
practice, however, is fully consistent with a historical gloss approach to
constitutional interpretation, as we explained in Part II.
In sum, a narrow account of liquidation is genuinely distinct from
gloss, which does not insist on permanent fixation through practice and,
relatedly, does not privilege early practice when it conflicts with
longstanding subsequent practice. Indeed, the Burkean consequentialist,
decisional capacity, and deference justifications for gloss, outlined above
in Section II.B, suggest that, if anything, durable modern practices should
be privileged over earlier ones (because, for example, those who have
engaged in the modern practices are closer to contemporary conditions
and problems). As we have explained, however, those very distinctions
between the narrow account of liquidation and gloss render the narrow
account of liquidation normatively problematic.
B. The Broader Account: Gloss by Another Name?
1. The Broader Account of Liquidation. In a recent article, another
originalist scholar, Professor Will Baude, seeks to “reconstruct[] James
Madison’s theory of postenactment historical practice, sometimes called
‘liquidation.’”192 According to Baude, that theory had three elements.
First, the text of the Constitution had to be indeterminate with respect to
constitutional provisions respecting their powers, and therefore should be taken as fixing the
meaning of those provisions, if otherwise doubtful.”); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
175 (1926); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803). Although the Court in Stuart
v. Laird referenced acquiescence only for a period of several years, it is worth remembering
that there were not many years to speak of in 1803.
191
Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2594 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
192
Baude, supra note 30, at 4.
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the question at issue.193 If a textual provision was clear, there was no
occasion for liquidation. Second, government officials had to engage in a
course of deliberate practice.194 That element required repeated decisions
or actions, not just one decision or action. Moreover, such repeated
decisions or actions had to include reasoning about the constitutional
question at issue, not simply decisions or actions publicly justified with
whatever reasons, such as argumentation about the policy wisdom or
political expediency of the decisions or actions—although, Baude adds,
such constitutional reasoning did not have to be genuine.195 Third, the
accretion of practice must have resulted in a settlement of the
constitutional question.196 That final element required both acquiescence
by the dissenting side and “the public sanction,” which referred to “a real
or imputed popular ratification” of the political settlement.197
According to Baude, Madison’s theory of liquidation “look[s] to the
most recent settled practice rather than privileging early practice or the
first fixed practice.”198 Because past liquidations are not necessarily or
characteristically permanent, Baude’s account of liquidation is broader
than Nelson’s.199 Baude nonetheless resists the conclusion that his
account is not “meaningfully distinct” from the historical gloss approach,
reasoning that “liquidation has both a different pedigree and a different
theoretical apparatus, and so it therefore seems to diverge from (or add
to) the ‘gloss’ project in at least three ways.”200 The first way is “a
different attitude toward the constitutional text.”201 Whereas “[i]n
liquidation, one must first ascertain that the constitutional text is
indeterminate,” Justice Frankfurter “implies that he envisions looking to
193

Id. at 13–16.
Id. at 16–18.
195
Id. at 48 n.290 (“The ultimate question for liquidation is not whether the government
officials really believed in the constitutional arguments they articulated, but rather whether
their interpretations reflected the public sanction.”).
196
Id. at 18–21.
197
Id. at 1; see also id. at 19–20. Madison referenced “the public sanction” in an 1830 letter
to Martin L. Hurlbut. See Letter from James Madison to Martin L. Hurlbut (reprinted as
Hurlbert) (May 1, 1830), in 9 The Writings of James Madison 370, 370–72 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1910).
198
Baude, supra note 30, at 63.
199
See also Michael W. McConnell, Time, Institutions, and Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. Rev.
1745, 1774 (2015) (“Presumably, this ‘fixing’ [through liquidation] is not irrevocable, but, as
in the case of precedent, departures require substantial justification and a similar process of
deliberation and widespread acceptance.”).
200
Baude, supra note 30, at 63–64.
201
Id. at 64.
194
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practice first and text second, rather than the other way around.”202
Moreover, Baude suggests that the two of us in other writings “do not
appear to view ambiguity as a hard boundary in the same way that
liquidation does.”203
Second, according to Baude, “[l]iquidation . . . requires that the course
of practice be the result of constitutional deliberation—and hence more
than just silence.”204 By contrast, he writes, “Frankfurter’s gloss focused
on what those in power have actually done . . . . Actions speak louder than
words.”205 Third, and switching from divergences between gloss and
liquidation to a way in which liquidation adds to the gloss approach,
Baude responds to the observation by one of us (referenced in Part II) that
historical gloss is actually a cluster of different approaches that reflects
different justifications for adhering to an accretion of political branch
practice. “[I]t is possible,” he writes, “that liquidation is actually a specific
kind of gloss, whose specific rules relate to its specific justifications.”206
2. Problems with the Broader Account of Liquidation. We will address
below whether either a narrow account of liquidation or Baude’s broader
account is properly attributed to Madison. Here we observe that Baude’s
account, by looking to the most recently settled practice as opposed to the
first fixed practice, is less vulnerable to the normative criticisms that we
described above concerning the narrow account. But Baude’s account
also diminishes the distinction between gloss and liquidation and
therefore reduces the need for a separate theory of liquidation. Moreover,
the differences that remain between Baude’s account of liquidation and
the theory of gloss—which concern liquidation’s requirements that the
course of practice be the result of constitutional deliberation and that the
public approve a proposed settlement—are themselves vulnerable to
substantial objections.
Contrary to what Baude suggests, gloss and liquidation do not
necessarily imply a different attitude toward the constitutional text. Both
accept that constitutional text that is perceived to be clear is controlling
even when there is contrary historical practice. Justice Frankfurter said as

202

Id.
Id. (first citing Bradley, supra note 21, at 830 n.317; and then citing Bradley & Siegel,
supra note 48, at 1241–42).
204
Baude, supra note 30, at 64.
205
Id.
206
Id. at 65.
203
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much in part of his canonical formulation,207 and to the extent that he
implied otherwise in another part,208 it matters more what the modern
Court has done in using the historical gloss approach, as well as what
commentators have argued in defending such use.209 As discussed in Part
II, the Court in Noel Canning invoked historical practice only after
concluding that the relevant portions of the text of the Recess
Appointments Clause were unclear.210 And while we have argued that
perceptions of textual clarity in American interpretive practice are
themselves affected in part by various non-textual factors, including
historical practice, that is a descriptive claim and is not inherent in the
gloss approach.211 In addition, as discussed in the next Part, it is
originalists attracted to the concept of liquidation who describe the
Constitution as indeterminate (and so amenable to fixation by practice)
on the question of the constitutionality of a national bank,212 the issue
regarding which “Madison implemented the principles of liquidation . . .
most thoroughly.”213 It is also such originalists who ascribe a perception
of indeterminacy to Madison and to Chief Justice John Marshall,214 even
though—as detailed below—each argued vigorously and confidently in
favor of their respective views of the bank’s constitutionality.215

207

See Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Deeply
embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot supplant the Constitution or
legislation . . . .”).
208
Id. (“Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government . . . give meaning to
the words of a text or supply them.” (emphasis added)).
209
The modern Supreme Court’s most famous rejection of a gloss argument was in INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), where the Court held that a “legislative veto” provision was
unconstitutional despite a longstanding congressional practice of including such provisions in
legislation, in large part because the Court perceived the relevant constitutional text to be clear.
See id. at 945 (“Explicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution prescribe and define
the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive in the legislative process.”).
210
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
211
See generally Bradley & Siegel, supra note 48. But cf. David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does
the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2015) (“Adhering to the text
would require us to relinquish many of the most important and well-established principles of
constitutional law.”). For an argument that it is more difficult to “know” the meaning of
statutory text in high-stakes situations and that this difficulty helps explain the tendency of
courts to treat the text more loosely in such cases, see Ryan D. Doerfler, High-Stakes
Interpretation, 116 Mich. L. Rev. 523 (2018).
212
See, e.g., Baude, supra note 30, at 21–29.
213
See id. at 21.
214
See, e.g., id. at 24–25.
215
See infra Part IV.
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Perhaps the disagreement that Baude senses between scholars who tend
to favor gloss and scholars who tend to favor liquidation is not a different
attitude toward the constitutional text but rather a different attitude toward
“the Constitution.”216 Interpreters most likely to be attracted to liquidation
might understand the Constitution as consisting only of the original
meaning of the text. On that view, liquidation would be part of
constitutional construction, which becomes permissible when the text is
indeterminate, but not part of the Constitution. Interpreters most likely to
be attracted to gloss, by contrast, might have a more expansive view of
what qualifies as the Constitution, understanding it to include materials in
addition to the original meaning of the text.217 Any such difference,
however, likely stems not from any inherent differences between
liquidation and gloss, but from differences in the interpreters who tend to
be attracted to one theory or the other. After all, historical practice
standing alone is not considered part of the Constitution itself under either
liquidation or gloss.218 And gloss, like liquidation, is compatible with the
idea of constitutional construction.219 Moreover, while it is true that gloss
might inform inferences about the constitutional structure as well as the
interpretation of specific textual provisions,220 many originalist judges
and scholars supplement their originalism with structural
argumentation.221 It is not clear why liquidation would be inapplicable to
such argumentation. In short, some versions of originalism could accept
gloss, and some versions of non-originalism could accept liquidation.222

216
For a recent study of the evolution in thinking about “the Constitution” during the decade
after its adoption, see generally Gienapp, supra note 31.
217
Cf. Whittington, supra note 46, at 3 (“Examination of political efforts to construct
constitutional meaning reveals that the governing Constitution is a synthesis of legal doctrines,
institutional practices, and political norms.”).
218
See supra Part II (discussing our approach to gloss).
219
See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 425–26.
220
See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 21, at 276–78.
221
See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 542–44 (2013) (structural principle of
equal state sovereignty); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–25 (1997) (anticommandeering principle).
222
There might be even more fundamental differences between originalists and nonoriginalists about the meaning of “law”—for example, about the extent to which law
encompasses consequentialist as well as formal elements, an issue that connects to
philosophical debates about legal positivism. Cf. Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory
of Legal Change, 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 818, 833 (2015) (“The originalist and the pluralist
simply disagree on which sources [of law] matter.”). But, again, such differences do not seem
intrinsic to the debate between liquidation and gloss.
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Professor Baude’s second attempt to distinguish his broader account of
liquidation from the historical gloss approach fares better. Whereas
Professor Baude’s account would always require the course of practice to
be the consequence of constitutional deliberation about the question at
issue, gloss (as explained in Part II) need not rest on the idea that it reflects
an agreement between the two political branches about questions of
constitutionality. Gloss can additionally or alternatively rest on riskaverse Burkean arguments about what has worked at least tolerably well,
about stability, and about reliance interests.223 Such considerations may
be deemed important when the practice has not been overly controversial
and has enjoyed bipartisan participation, and also when it may be
impossible to know all of the ways in which the practice reflects
compromises and accommodations over time, such that one should be
wary about attempts to pull on one component of the compromises or
accommodations in isolation. In addition, as also discussed in Part II,
gloss can rest on considerations of decisional capacity, which in some
instances will mean that longstanding governmental practices provide the
most defensible interpretive material regardless of whether they are found
to reflect interbranch constitutional agreement.224
Both descriptively and normatively, it counts in favor of the gloss
approach and against Professor Baude’s account of liquidation that the
justifications for crediting gloss include not only deference to the
constitutional judgments of government officials, but also Burkean
consequentialism and considerations of decisional capacity. As a realist
matter, such considerations almost certainly affect the constitutional
reasoning of most judges and commentators,225 and the gloss approach is
more transparent than Professor Baude’s liquidation account about that
aspect of interpretive practice. Statements like the following from INS v.
Chadha may be true in a sense, but they are incomplete as accounts of our
constitutional practice:
[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and
useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not
save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency
223

See Bradley, supra note 21, at 66–67.
See supra notes 96–104 and accompanying text.
225
See generally Bradley & Siegel, supra note 48, at 1213 (arguing that “whether [a] text is
perceived to be clear is often affected by various ‘modalities’ of constitutional interpretation
that are normally thought to come into play only after the text is found to be vague or
ambiguous”).
224
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are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic
government and our inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted by the fact
that congressional veto provisions are appearing with increasing
frequency in statutes which delegate authority to executive and
independent agencies . . . .226

It is true that efficiency, convenience, and usefulness do not supersede
“the Constitution,” and Chadha appears to have been a case in which the
Court thought that the meaning of the constitutional text was clear,
rendering resort to historical practice inappropriate. But functional
concerns and historical practice do play an important role in discerning
the constitutional separation of powers when the constitutional text and
structure are not perceived to be clear. Relatedly, rhetoric to the effect that
“we protect the Constitution even if it causes the heavens to fall” is likely
to be somewhat disingenuous, or at least unrealistic, which is why it is
extraordinarily rare to find judges or commentators who think that
enforcement of their own understanding of the Constitution would
actually cause the heavens to fall.
Normatively, it seems too restrictive—and would likely prove
destabilizing—to always require a strong showing of an interbranch
agreement or settlement about the meaning of the Constitution before
historical practice could be credited in constitutional interpretation. As
discussed in Section II.B, a number of important and longstanding
government practices, relating to both domestic and foreign affairs, in the
fields of both constitutional law and federal courts, do not clearly reflect
any interbranch agreement about constitutional meaning and yet have
become well-accepted aspects of our constitutional practice. Moreover, it
is not certain that early nineteenth-century political branch practice with
respect to the national bank satisfies Baude’s criteria, given that
constitutional opposition to the bank survived McCulloch227 and
culminated in the rejection by the popular (and populist) President
Andrew Jackson of both the bank and Madison’s position that the
constitutional question had been settled by practice.228

226

462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983).
See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 765 (1824) (rejecting an
attempt by an Ohio official to essentially relitigate McCulloch).
228
See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 A Compilation of the Messages
and Papers of the Presidents, 1789–1897, at 576, 581–83, 589–90 (Washington, James D.
Richardson ed., 1897); see also Baude, supra note 30, at 28–29 (discussing that episode).
227
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There is an additional way in which Baude distinguishes his broader
account of liquidation from the historical gloss approach, although he
does not take note of the difference. According to Baude, the liquidation
process is not complete until the public directly or indirectly approves one
proposed political settlement over others.229 He never explains what
counts as direct or indirect public approval and so how to discern it, but
that requirement does seem distinct from accounts of historical gloss,
which focus exclusively on the actions, inactions, and decisions of
government officials, not on the approval of the general public.
Always requiring (and so having to detect) public approval of a
political settlement before it can count as fixing the meaning of the
Constitution for a time seems to us both unrealistic and normatively
problematic. It is hard enough to use historical practice in a principled
fashion when focusing only on the conduct and arguments of government
officials. Discerning when “the public” has blessed the settlement seems
a hopeless task: without some way of knowing which proposed
settlements the public has or has not approved, that requirement seems
impossible to operationalize. For example, as just discussed, Baude notes
President Jackson’s reasons for disagreeing with Madison about whether
the issue of the constitutionality of a national bank had been settled, but
Baude offers no way of adjudicating the disagreement between them.230
In addition, as Baude observes, “liquidation can happen on mundane
constitutional questions that do not attract much public notice.”231 If
constitutional issues do not attract much public attention, it is not clear
how “the public sanction” can be forthcoming. For example, Baude
observes that Justice Joseph Story failed to understand the subtlety of
certain of Madison’s constitutionally conscientious maneuvers during
spending debates in Congress.232 Baude does not explain how the less
engaged and less discerning mass public could have figured out what
Madison was up to.
Moreover, even when constitutional issues do attract public attention,
the engaged public will rarely reach consensus on a given question. That

229

See Baude, supra note 30, at 19–20.
See id. at 27–29.
231
See id. at 66.
232
See id. at 32. Madison was worried that federal spending on sympathetic causes would
set legislative precedents for an unconstitutionally broad spending power, so he sought to
reframe certain instances of such spending as tax breaks or partial repayments of debts. See
id. at 29–32.
230
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is especially true in circumstances of cultural conflict or political
polarization, which have existed for much of American history and
certainly exist today. The requisite percentage of the public that needs to
sanction a settlement remains a mystery.
Requiring public approval also seems normatively undesirable, at least
much of the time. Baude does not defend requiring “the public sanction”
except to the extent he is making an originalist argument grounded in
Madison’s own views. He expressly disclaims making such an originalist
argument,233 even as he can be read to imply throughout his article that
his account of liquidation is justified in part by originalism and
Madisonian “pedigree.”234 In any event, requiring public approval makes
little sense with respect to many constitutional issues (such as the meaning
of the Recess Appointments Clause or the scope of the President’s
authority to recognize foreign governments), regarding which the mass
public will not be directly informed or engaged. Relatedly, Baude does
not address whether liquidation is, like gloss, relevant to illuminating
structural principles of constitutional law in addition to resolving
indeterminacies in specific textual provisions; if so, it becomes even more
uncertain how a public sanction requirement would make sense given the
public’s relative lack of awareness of structural principles.
Finally, whereas most defenses of gloss have focused on the separation
of powers for the reasons discussed in Section II.C, liquidation under
Baude’s account potentially applies to all issues of constitutional law,
including federalism and individual rights controversies. Although Baude
does not take a definitive position on the question of liquidation’s domain,
he notes that “[a]ny provision of the Constitution can be
indeterminate.”235 He also observes that the controversy over the national
bank, which he describes as “the archetypical example of liquidation,”
involved an issue of federalism.236 And while he acknowledges some
difficulties associated with fitting “Madison’s model” to individual rights
cases, he also observes in favor of such a fit that “Founding-era thought”
may not have understood individual rights as counter-majoritarian; that

233

See id. at 4 (“This focus on Madison is expository and conceptual, not dictated either by
history or constitutional law.”); id. at 35–47 (grounding liquidation partly in departmentalism,
precedent, and tradition).
234
See id. at 6, 32–33, 35, 50, 64, 65 (expressly or implicitly appearing to invoke originalism
or Madisonian “pedigree” as at least a partial normative justification for liquidation).
235
Id. at 49.
236
Id.
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the line between constitutional structure and individual rights is often
blurred; and that the “public sanction” element of liquidation may render
the concept suitable for individual rights issues.237 As we discussed in
Section II.C, however, there are serious questions about the normative
desirability of relying on historical practice to resolve many constitutional
issues outside of the area of separation of powers, particularly in the
domain of individual rights. Baude does not address those questions.
IV. MADISON’S THEORY?
Both Nelson and Baude have attributed the liquidation concept to
Madison. We are not persuaded that the concept, in either its narrow form
or the broader form suggested by Baude, is properly attributed to
Madison, although the broader account seems to us somewhat closer to
the historical mark. In any event, we do not think Baude has established
that Madison worked out anything like the systematic, three-part “theory”
of liquidation that Baude outlines.
Before beginning, it is worth asking why, exactly, originalists such as
Nelson and Baude are so eager to equate their ideas with Madison—why
they seek, in effect, to liquidate liquidation through Madison. Because
they otherwise reject the idea that originalism can self-justify, they
sometimes suggest that they are reconstructing Madison’s thinking
concerning liquidation merely because his ideas help illuminate a key
question that would be important and valuable regardless of whether he
happened to endorse it. On the other hand, in attempting to link
liquidation specifically with Madison, a Founder and one of the central
architects of the Constitution, they appear to be seeking to give the theory
an originalist pedigree (and, as noted above, Baude repeatedly appears to
invoke the theory’s purported pedigree).238 Implicitly, those theorists
seem to be suggesting that fixation through practice may be compatible
with originalism only if it can be made part of the “Founding,” with all
the intellectual and cultural weight that accompanies that designation.
Whatever the reason for focusing on Madison, in order to understand
what he was getting at in Federalist No. 37, it is necessary to put his
reference to liquidation in context. That Federalist essay responds to
Anti-Federalist criticisms that much of the language of the proposed
Constitution was indeterminate. Madison replied by emphasizing the
237
238

Id. at 50.
See supra note 234.
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extraordinary difficulties that the Framers had confronted in attempting
to draft a new framework of government. He noted that federalism was a
novel constitutional arrangement, so that the Framers had scant previous
experience from which to draw.239 He added that the Constitutional
Convention faced great challenges even in the area of separation of
powers, where previous experience was more substantial.240 “Among the
difficulties encountered by the convention,” Madison explained, “a very
important one must have lain in combining the requisite stability and
energy in government with the inviolable attention due to liberty and to
the republican form.”241 In emphasizing the Herculean nature of those
efforts, Madison pointed to the long experience of Great Britain in
attempting to work out differences in categories of law and jurisdiction, a
process that he noted was still ongoing.242 He then made the famous
statement about liquidation.243
Liquidation was required, Madison wrote, for three reasons. The first
was “the obscurity arising from the complexity of objects” needing to be
distinguished, including the distinction between federal and state power,
and the lines separating the executive, legislative, and judicial
authorities.244 The second reason concerned “the imperfection of the
human faculties,” which make it even more difficult to perceive those
objects.245 The third reason involved the limits of language, which
Madison characterized as “inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas.”246
“Hence it must happen,” Madison wrote, “that however accurately objects
may be discriminated in themselves, and however accurately the
discrimination may be considered, the definition of them may be rendered
inaccurate by the inaccuracy of the terms in which it is delivered.”247 As
Madison must have known, none of those justifications would ever
disappear, even after what he referred to as “particular discussions and
adjudications” took place in the early years of life under the new
Constitution—or even many decades hence.248 For example, just after
239

The Federalist No. 37, supra note 166, at 226 (James Madison).
Id. at 228.
241
Id. at 226.
242
Id. at 228.
243
Id. at 229.
244
Id.
245
Id.
246
Id.
247
Id.
248
Id.
240
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recording his observation about the limited extent to which any use of
language can convey determinate meaning, Madison wrote that “[w]hen
the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in their own
language, his meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and
doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated.”249
Federalist No. 37 is thus deeply skeptical of the determinacy of human
language: when speaking through such language, Madison was saying,
not even God can write determinately.
Recall also that Madison referred both to practice and to judicial
decisions as involved in liquidation.250 It seems unlikely, however, that
he was referring only to initial judicial decisions, because it would not
have been reasonable to expect all—or even most—issues of textual
indeterminacy to be resolved by the courts in the immediate aftermath of
the Constitution’s ratification, or even over the Constitution’s first
century. Given the common-law tradition that Madison referenced in
Federalist No. 37, it is also unlikely that he thought that a judicial decision
(or even a series of decisions) would fix constitutional meaning in a way
that would disallow subsequent reconsideration of the decision. There are
differing accounts of how strongly the Founders conceived of stare
decisis, but none of those accounts suggests that they thought settled
precedent concerning constitutional meaning could never be revisited
absent an Article V amendment.251
249

Id.; cf. Gienapp, supra note 31, at 110–11 (“At no point during ratification did any
participant offer a more sophisticated account of language, its inherent complexities, and the
peculiar problems it posed for written constitutionalism.”).
250
See McConnell, supra note 199, at 1776 (“The rationale for liquidation by longstanding
practice of democratically accountable bodies is mostly the same as—but more democratic
than—the rationale for liquidation by judicial precedent. Madison referred to both forms of
liquidation in the same breath.”); Peter J. Smith, The Marshall Court and the Originalist’s
Dilemma, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 612, 634 (2006) (“That Madison believed that congressional
deliberation or popular action could fix constitutional meaning does not mean that he rejected
the notion that the courts could fix it in appropriate cases, as well. Indeed, his discussion in
The Federalist No. 37 and in other sources suggests that he saw both as viable means of
liquidating the meaning of constitutional ambiguities.” (footnotes omitted)). The same can be
said of Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78, which specifically references the courts. The
Federalist No. 78, supra note 166, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[I]t is the province of the
courts to liquidate and fix [laws’] meaning and operation.”).
251
See, e.g., Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding
Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 647, 662–66 (1999); McGinnis & Rappaport,
supra note 63, at 809–23; see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723, 757 (1988) (“In the American common law, stare
decisis states a conditional obligation: precedent binds absent a showing of substantial
countervailing considerations.”); Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent:
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For those reasons, Madison need not be read in Federalist No. 37 as
suggesting either that an initial course of practice would freeze the
meaning of the Constitution going forward or that only such practice was
relevant to constitutional interpretation. Instead, as historian Jack Rakove
notes, Madison can reasonably be understood as referring broadly to “the
ongoing enterprise of resolving ‘obscure and equivocal’ ambiguities
through ‘particular discussions and adjudications’—in a word,
interpretation.”252 Such a process of interpretation logically would include
frequent consideration of practice long after the Founding. As Rakove
points out, “only knowledge created by intervening developments could
supply the ‘want of antecedent experience’ felt by the framers.”253
To be sure, Madison did tell his colleagues in the First Congress that
their decision regarding the power of the President to remove executive
branch officers unilaterally “will become the permanent exposition of the
constitution.”254 Although Madison may well have believed as a
normative matter that future interpreters should give the decision weight,
his reference to permanence here can be read more simply as either an
effort to focus his colleagues’ attention on the importance of the issue or
a prediction of the probable precedential and path-dependent
consequences of the decision (he used the word “will,” not “should”).
Madison surely knew that whether it would in fact “become the
permanent exposition of the constitution” would depend on whether
future interpreters would accept the decision as authoritative. In that
regard, it is noteworthy that Congress subsequently insisted on a greater
role in the removal process, and the Supreme Court, despite resisting

Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. Rev. 419, 462–66
(2006) (discussing debates about the role of precedent during ratification).
252
Rakove, supra note 133, at 159; see also H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding
of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885, 910 (1985) (“Madison’s argument, which Hamilton
had anticipated in The Federalist No. 22, was of course a restatement in somewhat abstract
terms of the old common law assumption, shared by the Philadelphia framers, that the ‘intent’
of any legal document is the product of the interpretive process and not some fixed meaning
that the author locks into the document’s text at the outset.” (footnote omitted)).
253
Rakove, supra note 133, at 159; see also Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding
of Original Intent?, 5 Const. Comment. 77, 110 (1988) (interpreting Madison to mean that
“[e]arly and continued practice” would serve as “a check on (but not an invariable barrier to)
subsequent reinterpretation”).
254
1 Annals of Cong. 514 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). For a description of different
scholarly views about what, if anything, was actually agreed upon in this “Decision of 1789,”
see Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 477.
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some of those efforts in Myers v. United States,255 ultimately has allowed
Congress the ability to limit presidential removal of a variety of
officials.256 Normatively, moreover, it seems like an overreading to
replace what Madison actually said with words to the effect that the
decision of the First Congress regarding the President’s authority to
remove executive branch officers unilaterally “should become the
permanent exposition of the constitution no matter what the future may
hold.”
As noted above, another example commonly cited as evidence of
Madison’s embrace of the liquidation idea is his shift in public position
concerning the constitutionality of a national bank. In December 1790,
Alexander Hamilton submitted a plan for a national bank that would be
chartered by Congress. Madison, who had been elected to the First
Congress from Virginia, opened the debate in the House by declaring
emphatically that the bank bill was beyond the scope of Congress’s
enumerated powers.257 By 1815, however, Madison was President, and in
vetoing on policy grounds a bill to reauthorize the bank, he
[w]aiv[ed] the question of the constitutional authority of the Legislature
to establish an incorporated bank as being precluded in my judgment
by repeated recognitions under varied circumstances of the validity of
such an institution in acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches of the Government, accompanied by indications, in different
modes, of a concurrence of the general will of the nation.258

In that veto message, Madison did not appear to be saying that initial
practice had fixed the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause for all
time absent a formal amendment. Instead, he seemed to be suggesting
that, because the political branches and the general public had long agreed
that the bank was constitutional, he no longer felt entitled as President to

255

272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (holding that “the provision of the law of 1876, by which the
unrestricted power of removal of first class postmasters is denied to the President, is in
violation of the Constitution, and invalid”).
256
See, e.g., Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935); Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 692–93 (1988).
257
Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank (Feb. 2, 1791), in James Madison:
Writings 480 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) [hereinafter Madison, Bank Speech].
258
James Madison, Veto Message on the National Bank (Jan. 30, 1815), in 1 A Compilation
of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789–1897, supra note 228, at 555, 555; see
also Richard S. Arnold, How James Madison Interpreted the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
267, 288–89 (1997).
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insist on his own private opinion of the constitutional text, original
understanding, and constitutional structure in considering whether to sign
the bill into law.259 Such a view is consistent with historical gloss, as is
his analogy to judicial precedent in subsequent correspondence discussing
the issue.260 It is also worth keeping in mind that, in his veto message,
Madison was speaking as an elected statesman responsible for
considering the overall national interest, an institutional position that may
reflect considerations that will not necessarily carry over to other
interpretive contexts.
Just as importantly, even if Madison had been suggesting that postFounding practices and beliefs had fixed the meaning of the Constitution
in favor of the permissibility of the bank, it would not have been an
example of liquidation as that concept has been described by scholars
such as Nelson and Baude. The liquidation concept posits that certain
issues of constitutional meaning were left unresolved at the Founding
because the constitutional text was indeterminate with respect to them.
Madison, however, never believed that the meaning of the Constitution
was indeterminate with respect to the permissibility of a national bank,
which is why he argued so forcefully against its constitutionality in the
First Congress—and why, as Baude himself observes, Madison wrote in
an 1831 letter to Charles Haynes that his “abstract opinion of the text of
the Constitution is not changed.”261 Throughout his career in public life,
he continued to believe that the Constitution supported his previous
view.262 He also suggested that, if it had been known at the time of the
Founding that the Supreme Court would adopt the broad reasoning in
McCulloch in support of the constitutionality of the bank, the Constitution
might not have been ratified.263 But because too many other institutions
259

See Arnold, supra note 258, at 289–90.
See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), in 4 Letters
and Other Writings of James Madison 183, 184–85 (New York, R. Worthington 1884)
(analogizing respect for historical practice to judicial deference to precedent).
261
See Baude, supra note 30, at 25 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Charles E.
Haynes (Feb. 25, 1831), in 9 The Writings of James Madison 442, 442–43 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1910)).
262
See Powell, supra note 252, at 940 (“His own ‘abstract opinion of the text’ remained
unchanged: the words of the Constitution did not authorize Congress to establish the bank.”
(quoting Letter from James Madison to Charles E. Haynes (Feb. 25, 1831), in 9 The Writings
of James Madison 442, 442–43 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910))).
263
See Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane, supra note 166, at 450–51 (“But it
was anticipated I believe by few if any of the friends of the Constitution, that a rule of
construction would be introduced as broad & as pliant as what has occurred. And those who
260
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and individuals had disagreed with him over an extended period of time,
he “did not feel [him]self, as a public man, at liberty to sacrifice all these
public considerations to [his] private opinion.”264 In other words, in what
is cited as the most significant example of Madison’s purported theory of
liquidation, it is not even clear that Madison viewed it in those terms.265
Baude hedges in suggesting that Madison thought the Constitution was
indeterminate on the question of the bank’s constitutionality,266 and he
offers little supporting evidence. He relies upon Madison’s statement in
the House opposing the first bank bill that “[t]he doctrine of implication
is always a tender one,”267 as well as Madison’s references to interpretive
rules for “controverted” and “doubtful” cases.268 Those few utterances,
however, do not establish that Madison perceived indeterminacy, and the
overwhelming thrust of the speech in which they appear suggests
otherwise.
After discussing the policy merits of the bank bill, Madison turned to
its constitutionality, emphasizing his personal knowledge of the fact that
the Constitutional Convention had decided against giving Congress the
power to charter corporations.269 He then argued both that there was an
attenuated link between federal power to charter a corporation and any

recollect, and still more those who shared in what passed in the State Conventions, thro’ which
the people ratified the Constitution, with respect to the extent of the powers vested in
Congress, cannot easily be persuaded that the avowal of such a rule would not have prevented
its ratification.”).
264
Letter from James Madison to Marquis de LaFayette (Nov. 1826), in 3 Letters and Other
Writings of James Madison 538, 542 (New York, R. Worthington 1884).
265
See also Noah Feldman, The Three Lives of James Madison 611 (2017) (“He had
opposed Hamilton’s proposed national bank as unconstitutional . . . . But he had come to
accept that the bank became constitutional after Congress and the president adopted it anyway
and it functioned for twenty years.” (emphasis added)); Sandy Levinson, Our Inevitably
Living Constitution, Balkinization, (Oct. 23, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/10/our-inevitably-living-constitution.html [https://perma.cc/X5EL-T7RB] (“[Madison]
never for an instant admitted that he had been mistaken in his 1791 opposition to the Bank,
only that it was time in effect to move on.”).
266
Baude, supra note 30, at 25 (“Indeed, for all of Madison’s forceful condemnation of the
bank in his 1791 speech in Congress, he also seemed to admit that the question was sufficiently
indeterminate as to require such construction.” (emphasis added)).
267
See id. (alteration in original) (quoting Madison, Bank Speech, supra note 257, at 486).
268
See id. (quoting Madison, Bank Speech, supra note 257, at 482).
269
Madison, Bank Speech, supra note 257, at 482 (“[H]e had reserved to himself, he said,
the right to deny the authority of Congress to pass [the bank bill]. He had entertained this
opinion from the date of the constitution. His impression might perhaps be the stronger,
because he well recollected that a power to grant charters of incorporation had been proposed
in the general convention and rejected.”).
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enumerated power, and that the creation of a corporation was “a great and
important power,” which meant that such a power, in order to exist at the
federal level, had to be listed separately in Article I, Section 8; it could
not be left to implication.270 Baude himself explains Madison’s argument
when he writes that, in Madison’s view, “[t]o satisfy the Constitution, the
bank must be both ‘necessary to the end, and incident to the nature’ of the
underlying enumerated powers, and the bank was neither.”271 And rather
than suggest that he was offering a canon of construction in the face of
indeterminacy, Madison grounded his argument in the Constitution: “The
latitude of interpretation required by the bill is condemned by the rule
furnished by the constitution itself.”272 Madison’s summation of his
argument similarly expressed no doubt and grounded his argument in the
Constitution:
It appeared on the whole, he concluded, that the power exercised by
the bill was condemned by the silence of the constitution; was
condemned by the rule of interpretation arising out of the constitution;
was condemned by its tendency to destroy the main characteristic of the
constitution; was condemned by the expositions of the friends of the
constitution, whilst depending before the public; was condemned by the
apparent intention of the parties which ratified the constitution; was
condemned by the explanatory amendments proposed by Congress
themselves to the Constitution; and he hoped it would receive its final
condemnation, by the vote of this house.273

In light of the above evidence, it does not appear that Madison thought
the meaning of the Constitution with respect to the permissibility of the
national bank needed to be “liquidated.”274
Much the same can be said in response to Baude’s argument that Chief
Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court in McCulloch v. Maryland “also

270

See id. at 487 (arguing that examples drawn from the text of the Constitution “condemn
the exercise of any power, particularly a great and important power, which is not evidently
and necessarily involved in an express power”).
271
Baude, supra note 30, at 21–22 (quoting Madison, Bank Speech, supra note 257, at 484).
272
Madison, Bank Speech, supra note 257, at 486.
273
Id. at 490.
274
Accord Levinson, supra note 265 (“By the time he was opposing the Bank of the United
States promoted by his former ally, and now bitter enemy, Alexander Hamilton, the
Constitution was becoming less ‘cloudy’ and, Madison alleged, clearly adverse to Congress’s
power to charter the Bank.”). For additional discussion of Madison’s constitutional arguments
against the bank, see Feldman, supra note 265, at 319–23.
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hit the key elements of liquidation.”275 In the opening passage of the
opinion, Marshall discussed the historical practice concerning the First
and Second Banks, stating that such practice supported the Second Bank’s
constitutionality.276 That discussion, although a noteworthy invocation of
historical practice, was brief and was not the opinion’s central rationale,
as Marshall himself indicated.277 His opinion in McCulloch has not been
understood to reflect Madisonian liquidation in the face of textual
indeterminacy. Instead, his opinion has long been understood primarily to
reflect structural reasoning278: the federal government is supreme within
its sphere of action,279 and if an end is within the scope of Congress’s
enumerated powers (its sphere of action), then so are all convenient or
useful means.280 Indeed, Marshall had already decided that Congress had
the power to create the bank by the time he got around to examining the
language of the Necessary and Proper Clause.281 Moreover, in holding for
the Court that states lacked the power to tax the bank, Marshall also
employed structural reasoning, emphasizing that a part of the Union may
not tax the whole because the whole is not represented in the part.282 He
expressly stated that there was no textual provision on point.283

275

Baude, supra note 30, at 24.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401–02 (1819).
277
Id. at 402 (“These observations belong to the cause; but they are not made under the
impression that, were the question entirely new, the law would be found irreconcilable with
the constitution.”).
278
See Black, supra note 142, at 13–15 (interpreting McCulloch as a structural opinion).
279
See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405 (“If any one proposition could command the universal
assent of mankind, we might expect it would be this—that the government of the Union,
though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action.”).
280
See id. at 408 (“But it may with great reason be contended, that a government, entrusted
with such ample powers, on the due execution of which the happiness and prosperity of the
nation so vitally depends, must also be entrusted with ample means for their execution.”).
281
See id. at 411–12 (“But the constitution of the United States has not left the right of
Congress to employ the necessary means, for the execution of the powers conferred on the
government, to general reasoning. To its enumeration of powers is added that of making ‘all
laws which shall be necessary and proper . . . .’”).
282
See id. at 429 (articulating the “intelligible standard” that the states’ power of taxation
extends only to “[a]ll subjects over which the sovereign power of a State extends”). For a
discussion, see Farber & Siegel, supra note 106, at 96–99.
283
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 426 (“There is no express provision for the case . . . .”). After
noting the absence of textual authority, Marshall drew inferences from the constitutional
structure:
[T]he counsel for the bank place its claim to be exempted from the power of a State
to tax its operations. There is no express provision for the case, but the claim has been
sustained on a principle which so entirely pervades the constitution, is so intermixed
276
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To be sure, Baude’s broader account of liquidation, by not limiting
liquidation to the first fixed practice, appears to make better sense of
Madison’s various statements than a narrow account. We are not
persuaded, however, that Baude has rediscovered “James Madison’s
theory of postenactment historical practice.”284 To our knowledge, no
historian of Madison has discovered such a theory, and we are not
convinced that there is one, at least not one that Madison had worked out
in any systematic way. Baude significantly understates the problem when
he writes that the theory was “never quite systematically explained in a
single place.”285 We are skeptical that a modern legal scholar, even one
as talented as Baude, can develop an entire theoretical framework and call
it Madison’s theory based on snippets from Madison’s Federalist essays,
letters, and other materials, over the course of many years, during which
time Madison’s own roles and views on the scope of federal power, the
nature of the Constitution, and the practice of constitutional interpretation
were changing significantly.286
For example, we have no idea whether Madison would think that
Baude’s “public sanction” should always be required for liquidation or
gloss, even if Madison referred to such a sanction in some contexts. More
specifically, Madison never told us whether he thought public approval
was required even with respect to constitutional questions that, unlike the
longstanding debate over the First and Second Banks, did not attract much
public attention. We might be tempted to suggest that Madison was far
too sensible a thinker to have thought such a thing, but in truth we would
just be guessing as much as Baude appears to be guessing in suggesting
otherwise. Notably, however, historian Jonathan Gienapp reads Madison
with the materials which compose it, so interwoven with its web, so blended with its
texture, as to be incapable of being separated from it, without rending it into shreds.
This great principle is, that the constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof
are supreme; that they control the constitution and laws of the respective States, and
cannot be controlled by them.
Id. To be clear, Marshall himself may have viewed his structural reasoning as part of proper
textual interpretation, as opposed to an alternative to it; our point is simply that such reasoning,
rather than historical practice, was the central thrust of the opinion.
284
Baude, supra note 30, at 4.
285
Id. at 13.
286
See Gienapp, supra note 31, at 161–62, 209, 321–22, 327–32 (discussing the changes
over time in Madison’s views on those subjects). For an argument that Madison developed his
enumerated-powers objection late in the debate over the Bank and that the objection seemed
to depart from his prior views about the Constitution, see Richard Primus, “The Essential
Characteristic”: Enumerated Powers and the Bank of the United States, 117 Mich. L. Rev. 415
(2018).
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as suggesting during the 1789 debate over the removal of executive
branch officers that recourse to “the people themselves, instantiated in
some form,” as Gienapp puts it, “was not actually necessary.”287 Our best
sense is that Madison never developed a clear account of what the “public
sanction” was288 or when it was required.289 He seemed convinced that
the right sort of public approval in the right sort of circumstance could
clarify or elaborate upon the meaning of the Constitution, but he did not
seem able to explain exactly what that would mean in operation given his
concerns that the people were capable of behaving badly and that political
leadership was required to avoid such behavior by the mass public.290
Madison’s unresolved difficulties in that regard not only suggest the
unworkability of a public sanction requirement, but they also cast doubt
more generally on the possibility of maintaining a strict version of
liquidation, with an operative set of rules, of the sort championed by
Baude.
Relatedly, Baude never critically examines Madison’s statements to
probe them for consistency or coherency, or for whether they are really
about liquidation per se. To take one example, Madison’s statement to his
colleagues in 1789 when debating the removal power that their decision

287

Gienapp, supra note 31, at 142.
See Jonathan Gienapp, How to Maintain a Constitution: The Virginia and Kentucky
Resolutions and James Madison’s Struggle with the Problem of Constitutional Maintenance,
in Nullification and Secession in Modern Constitutional Thought 53, 76 (Sanford Levinson
ed., 2016) (“Public opinion, by which Madison meant not public sentiment (which was often
impassioned and frenzied) but the true rational interests of the people at large (buried beneath
the passions and the product of prudent reflection), was the source of sovereignty in the United
States. Here Madison handled the great problem inherent in popular sovereignty (that the
people could behave recklessly) by locating sovereignty not immediately in the people but in
the best version of themselves.”).
289
See id. at 77 (“Madison wrote not about what was but what he hoped would be,
suggesting that the American republic lacked the kind of public opinion necessary to maintain
the constitutional system. . . . Appeals to the people would be selective, based on the
emergency of the situation . . . .”).
290
Gienapp explains that Madison was better at wrestling with the right question than he
was at formulating an answer that satisfied him:
How can the public be activated—in prudential, moderate ways—such that their
sovereign authority not only undergirds the Constitution’s authority but also its ongoing
interpretation? How can the people be active in not only initiating the Constitution but
also in maintaining it? To Madison these were urgent questions. Although he perhaps
never offered clear answers, that was perhaps because he had hit upon an enduring
insight: that the matter was anything but simple. It is thus worth asking whether we
have reckoned with these questions as seriously as Madison did.
Id. at 90.
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would “become the permanent exposition of the constitution”291
ostensibly contradicts Baude’s view of how liquidation works (because
according to Baude, Madison thought that a liquidation is not necessarily
permanent). Baude tries to explain this inconsistency by simply noting
that “[i]t might be the case that liquidation was expected to be permanent,
but these expectations might not always come true.”292 Our view, as we
noted above, is that in at least some of the statements that Baude cites,
Madison was probably making a practical point rather than any point
about constitutional theory. When debating new issues (whether in a
legislature or at a faculty meeting), people commonly talk about the need
to be attentive to the precedent being set; that does not require a
constitutional theory, let alone the liquidation theory as described by
Baude. The same can be said of Madison’s occasional warnings to
colleagues about “establishing a dangerous precedent”293 in spending
debates—that is just a common observation to make when contemplating
any new actions. Baude’s effort, as he puts it, to “charitably reconstruct
[Madison’s] theory of liquidation”294 relies on various statements by
Madison that he may not have intended to reflect a theory. If not, Baude’s
account is not a reconstruction of Madison’s thought and so should not be
confused with an originalist argument.
Although Supreme Court Justices are neither historians nor Madison
specialists, it is noteworthy that the majority in Noel Canning seemed to
interpret some of Madison’s statements on liquidation as consistent with
the historical gloss approach. In explaining the propriety of looking to
practice, the majority quoted a letter from Madison referring to
liquidation, and then said that “our cases have continually confirmed
Madison’s view.”295 As we noted in the Introduction, however, many of
the decisions cited by the majority endorsed historical gloss.296 Indeed,
the majority specifically included in that set of citations Frankfurter’s
concurrence in Youngstown. The majority correctly described those
precedents as “show[ing] that this Court has treated practice as an
important interpretive factor even when the nature or longevity of that
practice is subject to dispute, and even when that practice began after the
291

1 Annals of Cong. 514 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
Baude, supra note 30, at 59 (footnote omitted).
293
4 Annals of Cong. 170–71 (1794).
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Baude, supra note 30, at 13.
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Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014).
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See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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founding era.”297 That statement is entirely consistent with the historical
gloss approach. Thus, the majority—reasonably, we think—interpreted
Madison’s reference to liquidation differently from how it has been
interpreted by originalist scholars like Nelson and Baude.
Of course, even if Madison was endorsing a worked-out theory of
liquidation, it is not clear what implications that fact would or should have
for interpreters today. Nelson and Baude have not shown (and do not
claim to have shown) that Madison’s views on that matter represented a
general consensus of the Founders about how the Constitution should be
interpreted (or “constructed”).298 Moreover, Gienapp has recently
emphasized the lack of a Founding consensus about what the Constitution
was or how it should be interpreted.299 But even if it could be shown that
there was such a consensus, the implications would still be unclear, given
(to reiterate) that originalism cannot prove originalism. Originalists like
Nelson and Baude seem to be trying to justify liquidation as originalist by
tying it to Madison, while at the same time never quite claiming that such
a connection would be sufficient.
Granted, if one accepts a particular species of originalism known as
“original methods” originalism and if it is shown that liquidation is the
approach that would have been used by the Founders, then liquidation
might carry through with the commitment to originalism.300 But it is far
from clear that the concept of liquidation is an original Founding method
for interpreting and applying the Constitution, and, in any event, most
originalists are not original methods originalists. For most originalists, if
they accept a role for post-Founding practice, it is because they accept the
idea of “constitutional construction,” which is an enterprise that by
definition is supposed to be distinct from “constitutional interpretation”
297

Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2560.
Scholars sometimes generalize too quickly from Madison’s views to the views of “the
Framers” or “the Founders” or “the Founding generation” as a whole. For a cautionary tale,
see generally Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 611, 611 (1999)
(“Madison’s argument [in Federalist No. 10], particularly those aspects that are important to
theorists today, played essentially no role in shaping the Constitution or its ratification.”).
299
See generally Gienapp, supra note 31, at 116–23 (explaining the uncertainty surrounding
the Federalists’ and Anti-Federalists’ “fractured, partial, and contradictory” rules of
interpretation).
300
“Original methods originalism” is the view that interpreters today should apply the same
methods of interpretation that the “enactors” of the Constitution would have employed. See,
e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 47; John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,
Originalism and the Good Constitution 116–38 (2013) (arguing “that the enactors in 1789
deemed originalist interpretive methods applicable to the Constitution”).
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and thus does not follow from the Constitution’s original meaning. For
such originalists, as well as, of course, for non-originalists, the normative
differences between liquidation and gloss should matter.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. Constitution is the oldest written constitution in the world,
and it is also one of the most difficult to amend. Relatively short, it cannot
be said to “partake of the prolixity of a legal code.”301 In its original form,
the Constitution was primarily a framework for a new national
government, and its first three articles outline the structure and powers of
the three federal branches. For 230 years, the United States government
has operated under that framework even as conditions have changed in
ways beyond the Founders’ conceivable imaginations. Over the course of
American history, the institutions of the federal government have
themselves played an important role in helping to fill in and clarify the
framework through their practices and interactions, informed by the
realities of governance.
In recent years, legal scholars have become increasingly attentive to
the constitutional role played by such governmental practice. Theories of
“historical gloss” in particular have highlighted the role of historical
practice and attempted to situate it within constitutional theory. The U.S.
Supreme Court, in recent decisions, has also emphasized such practice.
Although it is easier to accommodate a role for post-Founding practice
within non-originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation, some
originalist scholars have also sought to take account of at least some of
that practice, under the label “Madisonian liquidation.” In this Article, we
have explained the originalist turn to historical practice, described the
historical gloss approach, compared gloss with liquidation, and suggested
that the differences between those theories concerning the proper role of
historical practice in constitutional interpretation render liquidation less
normatively attractive than gloss.
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